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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the U.S. Department o f State’s diplomatic handling of 
disputes over the seizure o f U.S.-owned property in Latin America between 1937 and 
1973. Seizures in Bolivia, Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba, Peru and Chile are used as case 
studies, and provide examples o f successful and unsuccessful diplomatic outcomes.
Several key factors are analyzed in each dispute, including whether the 
Department took a  conciliatory or confrontational approach toward each country, the 
kind o f  economic pressure applied, the situations under which the Department opted for 
official diplomatic involvement, and the types o f informal facintative assistance 
provided to U.S. claimants. The thesis then attempts to determine which measures 
helped to resolve outstanding disputes and which did not.
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SECTION I 
OVERVIEW
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Latin American seizures o f  U.S.-owned property over the last six decades have 
totaled more than three billion dollars. Starting with the first major Bolivian seizure in 
1937, the U.S. Department o f State shouldered the responsibility o f developing a 
response which balanced political, economic and security issues. In many cases, 
policies developed for Latin America shaped the U.S. response in other areas o f  the 
world. Although the trend in Latin America since the early 1980s has shifted toward 
privatization o f state-owned enterprises, U.S. handling o f property seizures in Latin 
America is vital for understanding the evolution o f regional relations in this century. 
This study will focus on the development o f State Department policy toward seizures in 
Bolivia (1937-42), Mexico (1938-42), Guatemala (1952-54), Cuba (1959-present),
Peru (1969-73) and Chile (1970-73).
Throughout this period, the State Department faced three types o f seizures: 
"nationalizations," "expropriations," and "confiscations." Each is unique and elicited 
different responses from the State Department. The term "nationalization" may be 
described as:
The transfer to the State, by a legislative act and in the public interest, o f 
property or private rights o f a designated character, with a view to their 
exploitation or control by the State, or to their direction to a  new objective by 
the State.1
‘Adeoye A. Akinsanya, The Expropriation of Multinational Property in the 
Third W orld. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 6.
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Whereas a "nationalization" usually refers to the taking o f all properties or investments 
within a particular field, "expropriation" most often connotes the seizure o f a  single 
property or investment.2 A frequently used definition describes an "expropriation" as: 
The procedure by which a  state, in time o f  peace and for reasons o f public 
utility, appropriates a  private property right, with or without compensation, so 
as to place it at the disposal o f  its public services, or o f the public generally.3 
Finally, the term "confiscation" refers to the seizure of privately-owned property 
without compensation, and does not necessarily imply that the seized property will be 
made available for public use.4 O f these three, the State Department had to deal with 
nationalizations most frequently.
This study analyzes six major property seizures, and the State Department’s 
response to each dispute. The case studies include: confiscation of a petroleum 
operation in Bolivia, nationalization o f the petroleum industry in Mexico, expropriation 
o f  agricultural lands in Guatemala, and widespread nationalizations in Cuba, Peru, and 
Chile. This effort differs from other works on the afore-mentioned property seizures 
by focusing primarily on the State Department's response, and how the Department 
adapted to a variety of seizures over approximately four decades.
2Stefan H. Robock, "Political Risk: Identification and Assessment," Columbia 
Journal of World Business 6, no. 4 (July/August 1971): 13.
3Samy Friedman, Expropriation in International Law. (London: Stevens and 
Sons, 1953), 3.
4Akinsanya. 3-4.
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In order to assess the State Department's performance, four factors in particular 
will be addressed throughout the case studies. As described in more detail below, these 
factors involve whether the Department was conciliatory or confrontational in its 
handling of each dispute, the type o f  economic pressure applied, the manner in which 
formal diplomatic involvement proceeded and the kinds o f facilitative assistance 
provided to the affected U.S. companies. The themes vary in relevance from case to 
case, but are designed to assess the consistency o f the Department’s decision making 
process.
The largest issue addressed is whether the State Department adopted a 
conciliatory or confrontational approach toward Latin American nations that seized 
U .S. property, and how this posture affected the final outcome of each dispute. Cole 
Blasier’s dichotomy o f conciliation versus confrontation will be utilized, in which he 
focuses on several cases of revolutionary change in Latin America and the U.S. 
government's receptivity toward these new governments.5 Blasier contends that in 
cases where Washington has been more conciliatory, the outcome has been politically 
advantageous for the United States. In this study, the issue of conciliation versus 
confrontation will consider the kind o f property seized, the dollar amount involved, the 
influence of the seized company in the United States, and the post-seizure attitudes of 
the Latin American governments involved. Finally, conciliation will be weighed 
against the economic costs of such a move.
sCole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in 
Latin America. 1910-1985. rev. ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985). 
6-7.
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The case studies also explore the forms o f  economic pressure the State 
Department had at its disposal during each controversy, the reasons why it decided to 
implement or withhold use o f these retaliatory measures, and the way in which this 
decision affected the final outcome. The Department lost some o f its flexibility in 
administering economic pressure when the U.S. Congress passed legislation requiring 
formal economic sanctions in the case o f  uncompensated seizures. Tracing the history 
o f the U.S. economic response will explain why Congress believed formal sanctions 
were needed, and why the Department, at the same time, opposed the move.
Next, the study analyzes conditions under which the State Department opted for 
formal diplomatic involvement. In cases where the Department interposed 
diplomatically on behalf of U.S. foreign investors, did the Department follow its own 
policy o f waiting until the U.S. claimant had first exhausted all local remedies afforded 
by the host government before interposing, or did it get involved prematurely? 6 
Before the emergence o f President Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, the 
State Department had a reputation for being overly eager to interpose on behalf of U.S. 
citizens when involved in Latin American investment disputes. The Good Neighbor 
Policy changed this by putting the importance o f long-term diplomatic relations first.
The final factor addressed is the level o f State Department diplomatic assistance 
to U.S. firms that fell victim to property seizure. Included in this analysis is a review
6Many authors prefer to use the term "interpose" as opposed to "intervene” 
because the latter often connotes that military force might be used. See Edwin M. 
Borchard's The Diplomatic Protection o f Citizens Abroad. (New York: Banks Law 
Publishing Co.. 1915), 441-42.
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of the measures taken by the Department to ensure that negotiations between private 
investors and the host nation progressed in a positive, constructive manner.
The thesis is organized into three sections. Section I provides an overview o f 
the historically differing U.S. and Latin American viewpoints toward both property 
seizures and the rights o f foreigners under international law. Section II presents six 
property seizure cases occurring under Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt (Bolivia and 
Mexico), Dwight D. Eisenhower (Guatemala and Cuba), and Richard M. Nixon (Peru 
and Chile). The case studies are analyzed according to the above-mentioned criteria 
and include examples o f both successful and failed diplomacy. The third and final 
section provides an overall look at the Departm ent's actions, describes the impact that 
the Latin American experience has had on U.S. policy, and highlights the lessons 
learned.
Several secondary sources helped to build the foundation for this thesis.
Foremost is Cole Blasier's The Hovering G iant, which focuses on cases of 
revolutionary change in Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, Cuba and Chile, and the impact 
of conciliatory or confrontational U.S. policies on bilateral relations. Meanwhile. 
Expropriation of U.S. Property in South America; Nationalization o f Oil and Copper 
Companies in Peru. Bolivia, and Chile by George Ingram and Expropriations of U.S. 
Investments in Cuba. Mexico, and Chile by Eric N. Baklanoff both study the origins of 
three major disputes, and post-seizure interaction between the U.S. government, each 
Latin American government and the affected investors. These two works inspired a 
concentration on property seizures as an outgrowth o f revolutionary change. Finally. 
Jessica Pernitz-Einhorn's Expropriation Politics investigates the State Department's
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decision making process toward one specific set o f  expropriations in Peru. This work 
sparked an interest in studying the State Department’s response to property seizure 
disputes.
Background for each case study came from a variety o f secondary sources.
Bryce Wood provides a  good account o f the Roosevelt administration’s actions toward 
Bolivia’s Standard Oil seizure in The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy. For the 
Mexican dispute, Lorenzo Meyer’s Mexico and the United States in the Oil 
Controversy. 1971-1942 gives a thorough description o f the Mexican oil industry 
nationalizations. The Guatemalan United Fruit Company land seizures drew 
extensively from Stephen Rabe’s Eisenhower and Latin America. Bitter Fruit: The 
Untold Storv o f the American Coup in Guatemala by Stephen C. Schlesinger and 
Stephen Kinzer and Richard H. Immerman’s well-researched The CIA in Guatemala: 
The Foreign Policy o f Intervention. Two of the best works found on the Cuban 
nationalizations are Response to Revolution; The United States and the Cuban 
Revolution. 1959-1961 by Richard E. Welch, Jr. and The Cuban Nationalization: The 
Demise o f Foreign Private Property by Michael W. Gordon. The Peruvian 
International Petroleum Company controversy relied extensively on Jessica Pernitz- 
Einhorn’s Expropriation Politics, which used personal interviews with State 
Department officials to obtain insight into the Department's decision making process 
during the course o f the dispute. The Chilean nationalizations drew from such sources 
as Modern Chile. 1970-1989: A Critical History by Mark Falcoff and former 
Ambassador Nathaniel Davis’ first-hand account in The Last Two Years o f Salvador 
Allende.
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Numerous other U.S. and foreign publications were used in this thesis. 
However, such accounts were frequently overly critical o f  either U.S. foreign policy or 
Latin American attempts at political and economic reform . Examples include Standard 
Oil’s Bolivia Takes What It W ants. Donald R. Richberg’s The Mexican Oil Seizure, 
and Communism in Guatemala 1944-54 by Ronald Schneider. It was therefore often 
difficult to strike a balance between extreme positions.
Assessment o f the day-to-day mechanics o f the State Department’s handling of 
individual property seizure disputes came from several key primary sources. Research 
material for the Mexican, Bolivian, Guatemalan and Cuban disputes was obtained from 
the State Department’s Foreign Relations o f  the United States and declassified State 
Department political and commercial documents at the National Archives. Useful 
information regarding the Mexican oil seizures was also found in the Library o f 
Congress’ Manuscript Reading Room collection o f the Josephus Daniels Papers. Since 
most o f the internal State Department documents have not been declassified for the 
more recent Cuban, Peruvian and Chilean controversies, transcripts from Congressional 
testimony were used extensively.
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CHAPTER n  
LATIN AMERICAN AND U .S. PERSPECTIVES 
ON PROPERTY SEIZURES
Divergent U.S. and Latin American viewpoints toward the role and utility of
foreign investment have developed over nearly a  century. In the wake o f the
independence movements beginning in the early 1800s, Latin American nations actively
solicited U .S. capital by offering tax breaks and special investment incentives. In the
early twentieth century, many o f those nations reassessed earlier economic programs
and, subsequently, opted for greater self-sufficiency and national control o f domestic
resources. As these nations attempted to break free from what they now viewed as
extensive foreign dependence, characterized by capital flight and exploitation by
multinational firms, U.S. investors became prim ary targets o f nationalistic economic
reform. M eanwhile, both U.S. proponents and Latin American opponents of
liberalized investment policies developed convincing arguments for their positions.
The L atin  American Perspective 
Although motives for seizure o f U.S.-owned property varied from country to 
country in Latin America, some broad generalizations can be made. As many 
observers were quick to point out, not all instances o f U .S. property seizure resulted 
from a desire to single-out U.S. investors as targets. Instead, Latin American nations 
targeted U.S. private investment because it was so pervasive and because it impeded 
nationalistic reforms. Also, whereas the United States has long viewed private foreign 
investment as instrumental in boosting Latin American development, some Latin 
American leaders were ambivalent toward such investment, which they believed
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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hindered economic progress. They argued that the "trickle down" approach often 
touted by Washington was an illusion. More specifically, many Latin American 
leaders asserted that private foreign investment actually created a monetary drain by 
removing repatriated profits, rather than reinvesting earnings in the domestic economy. 
Foreign enterprises also created few new job opportunities for nationals because they 
squeezed out domestic entrepreneurship. External control o f  vital industries such as 
mining, petroleum, or public utilities caused even greater concern because they often 
left host nations powerless to determine management o f those resources. Finally, 
critics opined that foreign investment inevitably introduced new cultural influences, 
generally viewed as undesirable.1
The official explanations for seizures o f foreign-owned property fell into at least 
one o f three categories. First, if the property was needed for public use, such as 
agrarian reform or the construction of roads, then the host government had the right to 
seize property. Guatemala used agrarian reform as its justification for expropriating 
United Fruit Company property in 1953 and 1954, as did Cuba in seizing U.S.-owned 
lands beginning in 1959. Second, the property in question may have been part of an 
industry considered vital to a nation's economic well-being and hence subject to 
seizure, as was the case in Chile's 1971-1973 nationalization o f U.S.-owned copper
•William D. Rogers, "U.S. Investment in Latin America: A Critical Appraisal." 
Virginia Journal o f International Law 11, no. 2 (March 1971): 149-50. Also, there is 
a substantial amount o f literature further explaining the dependency school theories. 
See, for example, Eduardo Galeano, Las venas abiertas de america latina. (Mexico 
City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1970), 394-404, 431-36; and Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979), 159-171.
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mines. Lastly, irresponsible behavior by the foreign investor could also justify seizure, 
as illustrated by Bolivia's confiscation o f  Standard Oil properties in 1937." The 
motivations for seizure frequently overlapped, such as in M exico's 1938 nationalization 
of the petroleum industry, Peru's 1968 expropriation o f  the International Petroleum 
Company, and Cuba's I960 nationalization o f two U.S.-owned oil refineries. In these 
last three cases, the affected companies were accused o f behaving irresponsibly in 
industries considered o f great national economic importance.
Additionally, all Latin American nations supported the Calvo Clause, that for 
decades represented one of the most contentious legal issues in U.S.-Latin American 
diplomatic relations. Named after an Argentine diplomat and publicist o f  the mid­
nineteenth century, the Clause declares that resident aliens are subject to the same laws 
as country nationals and have no right to request diplomatic intercession from their 
home government. The Calvo Clause’s justification, according to one renown 
supporter, is that it "seeks to serve a  legitimate function by attempting to curb the many 
flagrant abuses inherent in this process o f diplomatic intervention, and hence is morally 
sound."3 Several Latin American nations have insisted that the Calvo Clause be written 
into contractual agreements signed by foreign investors. The procedure ensures that
3George M. Ingram, Expropriation o f U.S. Property in South America: 
Nationalization of Oil and Copper Companies in Peru. Bolivia, and Chile. (New York: 
Praeger, 1974), 6-13 passim.
3Donald R. Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem o f Inter-American and 
International Law and Diplomacy. (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press,
1955), 34. For an explanation of the Latin American view toward the Calvo Clause, 
see, Ramon Betata and Ernesto Henrfquez. "La protection diplomatica de los intereses 
pecuniarios extranjeros en los estados de A m erica." Proceedings of the Eighth 
American Scientific Congress, vol. X (Washington. D .C .: 1940): 37-48.
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foreign investors are cognizant o f the host nation's rights and authority over properties 
within its boundaries. Proponents o f  the Clause argue that entrepreneurs are not 
obligated to invest abroad and are aware o f the inherent risks before entering 
contractual agreements. Moreover, these advocates contend that profits made by U.S. 
private investors in Latin America historically have greatly outweighed any loss 
incurred from acts o f  expropriation or nationalization.4 Disagreement between U.S. 
investors and Latin American supporters o f the Clause has yet to be resolved.
T he U .S. Perspective 
The U .S. government historically has tried to discourage nations from 
expropriating o r nationalizing foreign-owned property, since it believes foreign 
investment enhances, rather than hinders, economic progress. Eric N. Baklanoff 
describes the U .S . position as follows:
(1) that payment o f the required compensation diverts resources needed for 
economic development and depletes supplies o f foreign exchange (2) property is 
often transferred from competent private hands to governments that lack the 
requisite managerial skills; and (3) such actions tend to worsen the climate for 
private investment.5
While the U.S. government wants to dissuade expropriations or nationalizations, it 
nonetheless will respect a nation's right to do so, provided the foreign government
4Shea, 35.
5Eric N. Baklanoff. Expropriations of U.S. Investments in Cuba. Mexico, and 
Chile. (New York: Praeger. 1975), 5.
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presents U.S. investors with "just" (i.e ., prompt, adequate, and effective) 
compensation.
Where U .S. policy makers have parted company with foreign governments has 
been over the issue o f compensation. Compensation was at some point offered during 
all o f the cases under study, but differences remained as to whether proposed 
compensation was both prompt and adequate. Over time, the State Department moved 
away from insisting upon a  "just" compensation in favor o f  "prompt" compensation. 
Foreign nations often have been unable fully to recompense U .S. investors for their 
losses. Thus, the Department has, albeit unofficially, adopted the pragmatic view that 
it is better to receive at least some compensation for monetary losses rather than none at 
all.6 The Department's demand for just compensation must therefore be weighed 
against its desire for continued cordial diplomatic relations.
The issue o f the Calvo Clause has created a legal dilemma for the United States. 
While Washington no longer demands annulment o f this provision, or attempts to deter 
U.S. investors from entering contractual agreements containing the Clause, it does 
maintain that the Clause cannot serve to prevent diplomatic interposition on behalf of 
U.S. nationals. The U .S. justifies its position based on the Vattelian formula, which 
contends:
5Ibid., 2.
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an injury to a  national is an injury to the state o f that national, thus giving the
state rights o f recovery independent o f  the rights o f  the individual and not
affected by the individual's contractual waiver.7 
Although the U.S. government does not consider itself legally barred from interposing 
in Calvo Clause cases, the Clause can, under certain conditions, be a  determinant in 
deciding whether or not the U .S. government will sponsor a claim.8
The timing o f U .S. diplomatic involvement is another important consideration. 
The U.S. interpretation o f international law prohibits the State Department from 
interposing until an actual seizure o f U.S.-owned property has taken place. If a 
claimant acknowledges receipt o f compensation, the Department does not need to 
become involved. If, however, a  claimant has not received just compensation and has 
met the Department's requirement for exhausting (or attempting to exhaust) all local 
remedies, the Department then can officially present this claim before a foreign 
government.9
Once the Department becomes involved in assessing the value of seized 
property, innumerable problems can arise. Optimally, both the U.S. government and 
private investors prefer that the host nation pay a fair market value for seized 
properties, a value calculated as though the seizure had not taken place or as though the
7For further information regarding Emmeric de Vattel and the Vattelian formula 
see. Shea, 45.
8Ibid., 42-45.
9Ibid., 96-98. For a thorough discussion on the origin of the U.S. position 
toward the exhaustion o f local remedies, see. Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of 
International Law. (Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1943), 5:501-26.
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threat o f seizure had not arisen.10 It is frequently impossible, however, for either the 
investor o r the U .S. government to ascertain realistically these figures.
Three alternative methods exist for determining property valuation. The first, 
called a going-concern approach, analyzes an enterprise's past performance to 
determine projections o f future profitability and earnings o f the seized property. From 
the investor's perspective, this method is preferred, particularly in cases involving 
abundant mineral or petroleum resources. A second approach looks at the 
"replacement cost" o f the property at the time o f seizure, minus the property’s 
depreciation. This method does not count projected future earnings, and thus produces 
a lower valuation figure than either a fair market value or going-concern approach.
The third method assesses the "book value" o f the seized property by subtracting the 
property's depreciation from the original purchase price. O f the three procedures, the 
latter is considered least representative of the investor's property value unless the 
property was purchased recently with few or no new capital improvements. 
Compounding the assessment problem are drastically fluctuating inflation and exchange 
rates, or significant lapses between the settlement date and the date at which 
compensation is actually awarded. Furthermore, the market value o f service-oriented 
enterprises is often difficult to assess. In comparison with manufacturing and 
agricultural properties, their value is based more on continuous business and
l0Richard J. Smith provides a concise explanation of all o f  these methods of 
valuation in "The United States Government Perspective on Expropriation and 
Investment in Developing Countries," Vanderbilt Journal o f Transnational Law 9, no. 3 
(Summer 1976): 519-20.
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prospective profits than fixed assets.11 These issues will be further analyzed in Section
II.
U.S. policy also dictates that property seizures by foreign governments cannot 
be levied discriminately against U.S. investors. Laws promoting property seizure must 
apply equally to all foreign or domestically-owned properties residing in the host 
nation.12 However, claims of discrimination are often difficult to substantiate.
The 1963 Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs publication, 
Expropriation o f American-owned Property by Foreign Governments in the Twentieth 
Century, accurately summarizes the U.S. government's view toward property seizures: 
First, the United States has a responsibility in protecting the property o f its 
citizens abroad. Second, such actions may impair good international relations 
and cause strained relations to deteriorate further. Third, they inhibit the 
private investment in underdeveloped countries which the United States has 
sought as one method o f promoting economic developm ent.13 
Regarding the third tenet o f the above quote, abrupt termination o f foreign private 
investment is deemed detrimental to the host nation because it may hamper the
"Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Legislation on Foreign 
Claims: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 99th Cong., 2d sess., II and 
16 September 1986, 25-26.
I2Baklanoff, 5.
I3Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Expropriation o f American- 
owned Property bv Foreign Governments in the Twentieth Century, report prepared by 
Ellen C. Collier. 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963. Committee Print, vii.
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performance o f the affected enterprises, interrupt production, or cancel essential 
expertise needed to operate such investments.
Conclusion
The ideological differences toward the role o f foreign investment were well 
known both to U.S. and Latin American political leaders, and neither side expended 
much effort debating these issues. Rather, as the following case studies reveal, the 
State Department's decision to develop a conciliatory o r confrontational posture 
depended more upon extra-regional threats, such as communist expansion or impending 
world war, or the perceived treatment o f the affected investors. These factors 
determined the U.S. desire to use confrontational measures, such as strong economic 
pressure, o r a conciliatory, protracted process o f negotiation.
Differing views concerning the actual mechanics o f State Department post­
seizure involvement were more open to debate, and it was here that both the U.S. and 
Latin American governments found room to maneuver. For example, the Department 
was immediately confronted in each case with the question o f the appropriateness of 
diplomatic involvement. While cognizant that each Latin American government 
involved either explicitly o r implicitly subscribed to the Calvo Clause, the Department 
had to weigh diplomatic involvement against the possible long-term impact such a 
move could have on bilateral and hemispheric relations and the potential for further 
retaliation against other foreign-owned properties in the host nation. In cases where the 
State Department passed the initial hurdles and negotiated settlements, the question of 
just compensation proved most difficult to resolve. Although compensation would at 
some point be offered during each o f the disputes presented in Section II. none of the
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seized companies were ever offered what they considered fair market value as 
compensation for their seized properties. Instead, compensation offers were based on 
book value, extracted from the affected investor's most recent valuation for tax 
purposes, or some lower figure. W hile this is certainly an issue the Department 
preferred to watch from the sidelines, providing informal assistance, it inevitably 
handled compensation through formal diplomatic involvement.
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CHAPTER DI 
THE ERA OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY: 
BOLIVIA AND MEXICO
The State Department's commitment to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 
Good Neighbor Policy received two o f its strongest tests in Bolivia and Mexico in the 
late 1930s. In 1937 Bolivia confiscated property owned by Standard Oil Company of 
New Jersey. The following year, the governm ent o f  Mexico nationalized its petroleum 
industry. Both events provided the Department o f  State with its first large-scale 
exposure to property seizures in Latin Am erica and challenged President Roosevelt's 
promise o f  non-intervention in the affairs o f  our southern neighbors. The State 
Department attempted to balance the risk o f  economic loss and concern over setting a 
detrimental precedent against the long-range concerns o f maintaining the spirit o f the 
Good Neighbor Policy and the need for securing allies during a tumultuous pre-war 
period. This balancing act yielded similar results in both countries, as the State 
Department came to agreement with Bolivia and Mexico after a prolonged period of 
negotiation.
Bolim
Although the dollar amount o f the property taken in Bolivia was meager 
compared to later seizures, it gave the State Department a formal introduction to the 
problems it would face in the coming decades. The Bolivian action forced the 
Department to confront for the first time the questions o f appropriate representation 
that should be made on behalf o f U.S. investors and the proper degree of economic
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pressure to be levied against nations that seized U.S. property. The dispute proved to 
be easier than others the Department would have to resolve.
Background
Standard Oil began its Bolivian operations in 1922 under a fifty-year 
government concession. In March 1937 Bolivian President David Toro, without 
warning, announced the confiscation o f  the company’s Bolivian subsidiary for violating 
its concession. The Toro government claimed the company had violated its original 
concession agreement in three ways. First, it maintained that the company had illegally 
exported petroleum to Argentina between L925 and 1926 through a "clandestine" 
pipeline under the Bermejo River without prior government knowledge or consent. 
Second, the government accused Standard Oil o f  being remiss in its payment o f  back 
taxes. Third, it alleged that the company had failed to cooperate with Bolivia during 
the Chaco War both by refusing to supply aviation fuel when requested and by refusing 
to furnish the government with a $5 million loan solicited for the war effo rt.1 With 
these accusations, the battle lines between the two sides had been drawn.
In addition to these three official charges, the government had other reasons to 
confiscate. First, widespread international criticism of Standard Oil’s activities, 
including suspicions that it had incited the Chaco War (in which Bolivia was defeated), 
had significant impact on Bolivia’s decision. For example, well-publicized declarations 
by Senator Huey Long on the floor o f  the U .S. Congress accusing Standard Oil of
‘Memorandum from Grumman to Hull, 2 August 1934. 824.6363 St 2/34, 
Record Group 59 (hereafter, RG 59), National Archives. Washington, D .C .: Ingram. 
111-17.
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instigating the war convinced Bolivian leaders that the company was unpopular in 
Washington and, therefore, would not receive diplomatic assistance if the subsidiary’s 
holdings were confiscated. Second, Bolivia claimed that the subsidiary had not 
produced oil in sufficient quantities to meet domestic needs, causing the country to 
import larger amounts o f oil than it considered necessary. In other words, Bolivia had 
to purchase high-priced foreign oil while its domestic resources remained largely 
untapped and in the hands o f a foreign company. Third, observers noted that Bolivia’s 
demoralizing military defeat at the hands of the Paraguayans had caused public support 
to wane for the year-old government of President T oro .2 Toro seized Standard O il’s 
property in part to boost national morale and restore public confidence in the 
presidency.
Standard Oil officials moved quickly to defend their position by addressing 
Toro 's charges. They admitted having exported oil to Argentina, but stated that the 
action had occurred with full knowledge o f the Bolivian government. Furthermore, 
they claimed that such activity by the subsidiary was fully permitted under the 
concession agreem ent.3 As to the second point. Standard Oil executives, while 
acknowledging that the company had failed to pay the necessary taxes, claimed their 
action was justified. Shortly after signing the concession in 1922, the company and the
2Congress, Senate, Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana speaking on a 
reservation to a  W orld Court resolution, 74th C ong., 1st sess.. Congressional Record 
(28 January 1935), vol. 79, pt. 1, 1046-47; Bryce W ood, The Making o f the Good 
Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 162; and Telegram 
from Norweb to Hull. 18 March 1937, 824.6363 *St 2/81, RG 59.
S tandard  Oil Company of New Jersey, Bolivia Takes What It Wants (New 
York: Standard Oil Company, 1941), 12-13.
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Bolivian government became embroiled in a tax dispute. The problem stemmed from 
differing interpretations as to what constituted "production.” In exchange for a  drilling 
concession, according to the contract, the subsidiary was required to pay a sliding 
surface rental tax to Bolivia over a seven-year period. The tax was to increase 
incrementally from 2.5 centavos per hectare at the start o f production to an eventual 
rate o f  50 centavos. The Bolivian government alleged that production had to begin two 
years after the contract was signed, as required by a 1921 national petroleum law. 
Company officials disagreed, arguing that the term production implied production on a 
commercial level, a stage which the company had not reached even four years after 
commencing operations. Not until 1928 did both parties reach a compromise, agreeing 
that the company would begin payment of the maximum surface rental tax (50 centavos 
per hectare) on 1 January 1930. This agreement was abruptly terminated in 1931 by 
Bolivia's new President, Daniel Salamanca, who demanded that the company pay the 
sliding rental tax back to 1924, thereby returning the government to its original 
position. Standard Oil appealed its case through Bolivian legal channels and eventually 
received a hearing before the Bolivian Supreme Court.4 The case still had not been 
decided when the Toro government seized the subsidiary's holdings in 1937.
Standard Oil defended itself against the third charge o f noncompliance during 
the Chaco W ar by asserting that it simply could not meet the government's demands, 
including its request for a $5 million war loan, because the subsidiary lacked sufficient 
capital. Moreover, since Standard Oil was a multinational corporation with extensive
4Letter from Palmer to Duggan. 18 March 1937. 824.6363 St 2/70. RG 59.
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global investments, it did not want to endanger its operations elsewhere by taking sides 
in regional disputes.5
Lastly, Standard Oil countered Bolivia’s complaint o f  low production by 
explaining that although the company had poured over $17 million into projects in 
Bolivia by the early 1930s, it had become discouraged with the profitability o f  its 
Bolivian operations. The tremendous drop in world oil prices in the 1920s and the 
increased threat o f war between Paraguay and Bolivia led Standard Oil to believe that 
further capital investment and increased production in Bolivia was unwise. By 1932 
the subsidiary had ceased drilling new wells.6 After countering Toro's charges. 
Standard Oil executives concluded that its only recourse was to appeal directly to the 
State Department, since it expected little cooperation from the Bolivian government. 
The State Department Response
Initial State Department response to Toro 's confiscation was mild. From a 
policy standpoint. Department officials decided to uphold the stance of non­
interference, reasoning that a simple expression o f concern would suffice. Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull instructed his Minister to Bolivia, R. Henry Norweb, to express 
U.S. dissatisfaction to the Bolivian government and to acquire as much information as 
possible from all participants. The Secretary then ordered the U.S. Minister not to let 
himself or any other legation official become directly involved in the dispute. The only 
measure taken by Minister Norweb at this stage was to informally assist company 
executives by persuading the Bolivian government to grant Standard Oil representatives
sIngram, 115.
6Ibid.. 112-13.
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access to documents still housed in its former La Paz headquarters, as they were vital to 
the company’s defense.7 The Department's actions appeared commensurate with the 
perceived level o f severity o f the seizure.
Despite the Department’s initial gestures, the U.S. private sector pressed for 
greater involvement. Standard Oil representatives in La Paz and Washington 
immediately pushed for official representation after the confiscation. Additionally,
U.S. corporations with no direct interest in Bolivia expressed concern over the 
Standard Oil controversy to the State Department. An example o f such domestic 
sentiment was iterated by James D. Mooney o f General Motors in a letter to Secretary 
Hull:
As far as I know, this reported action on Bolivia's part is the first important rift 
that has appeared in [sic] the scene, and I am only fearful that it might, if 
tolerated, start the spread o f a contagion capable of undoing much o f the good 
you have so happily done.8 
The Department could not ignore expressions o f  concern from such powerful business 
leaders.
Instead o f directly interposing, the Department searched for alternative means to 
pressure the Bolivian government. Department officials urged the company to resolve
7Department o f State, Foreign Relations o f  the United States: 1937.
(Washington, D .C .: GPO, 1954), 5:28-29 [hereafter cited as FRUS with year and 
volume number]; Telegram from Hull to Norweb, 26 April 1937, 824.6363 St 2/90,
RG 59; Memorandum from Duggan to Welles, 19 April 1937, 824.6363 St 2/108, RG 
59; and Telegram from Norweb to Hull. 18 March 1937, 824.6363 St 2/70.
RG 59.
T e tte r from Mooney to Hull, 28 April 1937. 824.6363 St 2/117. RG 59.
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its problems through Bolivia's legal system. Moreover, the Department applied 
indirect pressure by silently curtailing new bilateral economic and technical assistance 
with the expressed message that the Bolivian government had to reconcile its 
disagreement with Standard Oil before such assistance could be resumed.9
A fter transmitting its initial instructions to the U .S. Legation in La Paz, State 
Department officials delved into the thornier questions surrounding the Department's 
legal right to interpose in the dispute should the need arise. O f primary concern was 
the Calvo Clause in the concession contract signed by Standard Oil in 1922. To 
resolve this issue, officials from the Division o f Latin American Affairs consulted the 
State Departm ent's legal adviser, Green Hackworth. After researching earlier cases 
where U .S. investors had signed contractual agreements containing the Calvo Clause. 
Mr. Hackworth presented his colleagues with two legal precedences supporting the 
government's right to represent private investors officially: the North American 
Dredging Company case in 1926 and the International Fisheries Company case in 1931. 
both of which dealt with property disputes in Mexico. From these cases, Mr. 
Hackworth concluded that the U.S. government did have the right to interpose 
diplomatically in the Bolivian dispute, regardless o f the Clause, so long as Standard Oil
9Irwin F. Gellman. Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin 
America. 1933-1945. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1979). 50.
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first exhausted, or demonstrated an effort to exhaust, all local rem edies.10 For the 
moment, however, Under Secretary Sumner Welles rejected this option, stating that: 
in view of the fact that the concession contained the Calvo Clause, diplomatic 
intervention on the part o f the United States is unwarranted and, on the grounds 
o f  policy, unwise.11
Welles recommended, instead, that Standard Oil present its case before the Bolivian 
Supreme Court. However, Standard O il's attorneys, and even some Department 
officials, commented privately that the Bolivian justices were unquestionably biased 
against Standard Oil, subject to tremendous domestic pressure, and would probably rule 
against the company regardless o f the merits o f the case.12 Nevertheless, to meet the 
Department's requirement for future assistance, the company filed suit in Bolivia in 
March 1938.
The Bolivian Supreme Court took an entire year to render a  decision. Delay 
resulted from several interruptions, including the drafting o f a new constitution in 
October 1938 by President German Busch (who had deposed Toro in July 1937), 
appointment of new justices, and a campaign o f media harassment against the Court,
I0Telegram from Division of Latin American Affairs to Welles, 25 March 1937,
824.6363 St 2/89, RG 59; Memorandum from Flournoy to Hackworth, 9 April 1937,
824.6363 St 2/106, RG 59. For details o f both cases see Shea, 194-240; and Frederick 
Sherwood Dunn, The Diplomatic Protection o f  Americans in Mexico. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1933), 406-18.
"Memorandum from Welles to Hackworth. 8 November 1937, 824.6363 St 
2/189, RG 59.
l2TeIegram from Norweb to Hull, 18 March 1937, 824.6363 St 2/81. RG 59; 
and Memorandum from Hackworth to Welles, 26 March 1937. 824.6363 St 2/103. RG 
59.
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which caused one o f the justices to resign. The Supreme Court finally ruled in March 
1939 that Standard Oil could not file suit against the State.13 The company now 
maintained that it had exhausted all legal remedies afforded by Bolivia, refused to 
continue direct communication with the Bolivian government, and increased pressure 
on the State Department to act.
Following this effort, in the spring of 1939 the State Department commenced 
secret, but unofficial, discussions with the Bolivian Minister to Washington, Luis 
Fernando Guachalla, hoping to impress upon him the difficulty that this dispute might 
create for future bilateral economic and political relations. The M inister’s involvement 
in these discussions was strictly on a  "personal" level. No notice o f these preliminary 
meetings was relayed back to La Paz, and with good reason.14 Foremost, there was 
strong Bolivian opposition to any compromise with Standard Oil, and discovery o f such 
activities at too early a stage would prove disastrous for the Busch. Also, the Supreme 
Court decision had clearly nullified Standard Oil’s legal right to receive compensation 
for its former properties. The parties involved believed, however, that a  solution 
agreeable to all could, and should, be sought. Over the next six months, the Bolivian 
Minister, State Department officials, and Standard Oil executives drafted a series of 
proposals for establishing an arbitral board. Eventually, in early 1940, the participants 
agreed upon a  proposal suggesting the creation o f a tribunal to determine not only the
13 Wood, 181.
14Memorandum from Butler to Welles, 11 April 1939. 824.6363 St 2/372. RG
59.
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amount o f  compensation owed the company, but also the am ount owed the Bolivian 
government by Standard Oil from the unresolved taxation dispute.
Two untimely events undermined these negotiations. The first arose with the 
suicide o f President Busch in the summer o f 1939. Carlos Quintanilla succeeded him 
as provisional president until April 1940, when General Enrique Penaranda won 
election. Penaranda, like his predecessors, desired bilateral assistance from the United 
States, but proved equally reluctant to alter his nation's position on the confiscation 
decision. The second event occurred in February 1940 when the Bolivian Minister sent 
a draft proposal to his superiors in La Paz for review. Before his government could 
analyze the document, it was leaked to the Bolivian press, giving Minister Guachalla no 
choice but to flatly deny that negotiations had taken place. A fter these setbacks, the 
State Department decided to reiterate to the new Bolivian President its determination to 
obtain compensation for Standard Oil, informing him that an equitable settlement was a 
prerequisite for further U.S. bilateral assistance.15 Negotiations remained at a 
standstill.
Heightened international tension soon altered the U.S. position. The threat of 
impending world war compelled Washington to establish cordial relations with its Latin 
American neighbors, for both reasons of hemispheric security and access to vital 
natural resources. The Roosevelt administration was determined to avoid a repeat of 
the disharmony in hemispheric relations which had existed throughout World War I.
l5The provisional government o f Carlos Quintanilla was also denied an 
extension o f credit because o f the oil controversy. FRUS 1937. 5:320-21; Wood. 183- 
85: and FRUS 1940. 5:516-17.
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when seven Latin American nations opted for strict neutrality. The desired method of 
assurance was through military and economic assistance agreements across Latin 
America. Department officials expressed particular concern over the possibility of a 
Bolivian-German agreement, giving Germany access to Bolivia’s petroleum resources.16 
The State Department increased its involvement to ensure a  favorable solution.
As the threat o f  war increased and negotiations once again stalled between the 
two parties, the State Department acted over company objections to keep Bolivia in the 
U.S. camp. Despite the unsettled $3 million property dispute, the Department 
prepared to loan Bolivia $25 million. In late 1941, the Department again informed 
Penaranda o f its desire that he reach an equitable settlement with Standard Oil but. also 
stated that it would follow through with the loan in the interest o f hemispheric 
solidarity.17 The next move lay with Bolivia.
The U.S. concession, coupled with U.S. entry into the Second World War in 
December 1941 had a conciliatory effect on the Bolivian government. As its 
contribution to hemispheric unity, the Bolivian Foreign Minister arrived at the Rio de 
Janeiro Meeting of Foreign Ministers in late January o f 1942 with President
l6GeIlman. 120-126; and Ingram, 118.
I7Wood. 196.
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Penaranda's permission to seek a  prompt solution to the Standard Oil dispute.18 U.S. 
and Bolivian officials commenced negotiations at once.
Standard Oil initially opposed the manner in which negotiations progressed. 
Company representatives protested Bolivia's low offers, reminding the State 
Department that they were demanding $3 million in compensation. They eventually 
yielded to Under Secretary o f  State Sumner W elles' persuasion and agreed to leave all 
negotiations regarding the sum o f compensation, and even the wording o f the final 
agreement, to the discretion o f  Department officials. One can deduce from company 
dialogues, however, that Standard Oil was less concerned with the monetary settlement 
than it was with saving face and preventing a  detrimental precedent. The final 
agreement required that Bolivia pay Standard Oil $1.5 million plus three percent 
interest, which meant a total o f  $1.7 million in compensation.19 This figure was just 
over one-half the compensation figure requested by Standard Oil.
At the end o f negotiations. President Penaranda approached the Bolivian 
Congress with a fa it accompli o f  not just "a signed agreement, but [also] the 
irrevocable action o f a cash settlement."20 To pacify critics. President Penaranda 
explained that the settlement opened the door for Bolivia to receive its $25 million
18Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to the Department o f  State, 16 January 1942,
824.6363 St 2/558. RG 59. The two-week Rio meeting had been called to address the 
problems facing the hemisphere as a result o f World War II. Arthur P. Whitaker. "The 
Inter-American System," in Inter-American Affairs: 1942. ed. Arthur P. Whitaker 
(New York, Columbia University Press: 1943), 11-15.
19State Department Press Release, 16 February 1942, 824.6363 St 2/606. RG 
59; and Wood, 197. 199.
:0Wood, 199.
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economic development loan from the United States. He further justified his actions by 
reminding the Bolivian Congress that the amount paid to Standard Oil was a mere ten 
percent o f  the $17 million the company had invested. M oreover, he declared that the 
sum paid was not so much in compensation for the subsidiary's confiscation, as it was 
an exchange for maps and data possessed by the company which, he asserted, Bolivian 
technicians deemed invaluable for future petroleum exploration.21 The Bolivian 
Congress reluctantly complied, thus ending the oil controversy.
The Bolivian dispute revealed that the State Department could balance its 
involvement in Latin American investment disputes against the provisions set forth in 
the Good Neighbor Policy. The Department withstood pressure from the private 
sector, used moderate economic pressure, and interposed only when talks reached a 
standstill. Self-restraint was only breached once the threat o f  World War II made 
prompt resolution an imperative. The Department's approach would be repeated once 
again toward Mexico.
Mexico
As in Bolivia, Mexico's outright nationalization o f its oil industry in 1938 came 
as a surprise to the State Department and the sixteen affected Mexican and foreign 
firms. Although conflict had erupted frequently since commencement o f the Mexican 
Revolution in 1911, as successive Mexican governments imposed greater demands on 
an increasingly hostile industry, few believed that the Lazaro Cardenas government 
would attempt such a daring move. As Standard Oil of New Jersey, Cities Service
2lIbid.. 200: and Blasier. 87.
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Group, the Sinclair Group, the Sabalo Group, and other U.S. companies turned to the 
State Department for assistance, the Department would once again have to weigh its 
involvement in this larger and more difficult dispute against its desire to adhere to the 
Good Neighbor Policy.
Background
U.S. involvement in Mexico's oil industry began under the dictatorship o f 
Porfirio Diaz (1876-1880, 1884-1911). President Diaz sought to encourage increased 
foreign investment through tax incentives, exemption from constrictive legislation, and 
sundry privileges, which he hoped in turn would lead to infrastructure development and 
economic growth. To spur investment in the extractive industries, Diaz implemented 
measures to override the colonial-era Spanish principle declaring state ownership o f 
subsoil resources." Since the domestic elite opted to concentrate on the traditional 
activities o f ranching and agriculture, it was U .S ., British, and Dutch venture capital 
that led Mexican oil exploration starting in the early 1900s.
The ouster o f Diaz and beginning o f the Mexican Revolution in 1911 led to the 
"golden era" o f oil production, which lasted until 1921. This period coincided with 
World War I, the initial boom o f the U.S. automobile industry, and the most turbulent 
years o f the Mexican Revolution. However, a decade-long reversal began in 1921. 
attributable in large part to wasteful overproduction, an unstable political climate, taxes
“ Lorenzo Meyer. Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy. 1917- 
1942. (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1972), 31; Antonio J. Bermudez, The 
Mexican National Petroleum Industry: A Case Study in Nationalization. (Stanford: 
Institute o f Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1963), 2; and George W. 
Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil. (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press.
1980), 9.
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imposed by the early Revolutionary governments o f Fransisco Madero and Victoriano 
Huerta, and more promising discoveries in Peru and Venezuela.23 These trends are 
demonstrated graphically in Figure 1.
Promulgation o f the 1917 Constitution under President Venustiano Carranza 
(1914, 1915-1920) further unsettled foreign oil interests. Article 27 o f  the 
Constitution, which affirmed national sovereignty over subsoil resources, led the oil 
companies (now 90 percent foreign owned) to question whether the provision was 
intended to apply retroactively to oil producing lands. Such a move would constitute a 
reversal of subsoil rights awarded years earlier by President Dfaz. Mexican nationalists 
argued that the constitutional provision should apply retroactively, as it superseded all 
previous laws. So as not to provoke a crisis, Carranza repeatedly assured the oil 
companies and the State Department that the retroactivity o f Article 27 was not directed 
at the petroleum industry, and settled instead for imposing new taxes on oil 
production.24 Despite Carranza's overtures, uncertainty over Article 27 remained a 
point o f contention between the United States and Mexico.
Failure to fully allay private sector concerns led the State Department to 
pressure the Mexican government for clarification. President Warren G. Harding’s
^Johnathan C. Brown, "Why Foreign Oil Companies Shifted Their Production 
from Mexico to Venezuela during the 1920s," The American Historical Review 90. no 
2 (April 1985): 383-85; Wendell Chaffee Gordon. The Expropriation o f Foreign- 
Owned Property in Mexico. (Washington, D .C .: American Council on Public Affairs, 
1941), 54 and 59; and Meyer, 31, 32, 87.
24George Ward Stocking, "The Mexican Oil Problem," Arnold Foundation 
Studies in Public Affairs 6, no. 4 (Spring 1938): 2: Amos J. Peaslee, Constitutions of 
Nations. (Concord: The Rumford Press. 1950), 2:421-26: and Meyer. 57. 59-61.







Figure 1 Oil Production in Mexico: 1909 - 1937. Source, Meyer, 8-9.
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government withheld diplomatic recognition to President Alvaro Obregon in 1921 after 
Carranza's assassination. In exchange for recognition, the State Department demanded 
that the Mexican government first establish a formal agreement to safeguard private 
investment in Mexico and clarify the issue of retroactivity. Obregon held his ground, 
insisting that recognition precede such an agreement. Not until the end of Obregon's 
presidency were differences settled. Although no treaty was signed, the two 
governments reached an understanding in the summer o f 1923 known as the Bucareli 
Agreement. Mexico offered the oil companies concessions o f unlimited duration for 
those lands on which "positive acts" had been performed. Since the agreement 
established a broad definition o f what constituted a  "positive act," almost all petroleum 
properties fell within this category.25 Despite these generous concessions on behalf of 
the petroleum industry, the agreement was a partial victory for Mexico because it 
forced the United States to tacitly acknowledge state ownership of subsoil resources.
The investment climate was again shaken in 1925 under Obregon's successor, 
Plutarco Ellas Calles (1924-1928). Calles' 1925 Petroleum Law brought into question 
the status o f the oil industry by requiring that the oil companies receive government 
confirmation of their holdings and by reducing the previously agreed-upon concessions 
o f unlimited duration to a period of fifty years. After prolonged negotiations, U .S. 
Ambassador Dwight Morrow in 1928 managed to obtain favorable conditions for the 
oil companies by convincing President Calles to amend contentious segments o f the
^M eyer. 78-82. 102.
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Petroleum Law .26 Calles' successors, Portes Gil (1928-1930), Ortiz Rubio (1930- 
1932), and Abeiardo Rodriguez (1932-1934), all adhered to the 1928 agreement, and 
the period o f tranquility lasted until President Lazaro Cardenas assumed office in 1934.
President Cardenas (1934-1940) proved more determined than his predecessors 
to implement substantial socio-economic reforms. He wanted to nationalize the 
railroads and public utilities, reform agrarian holdings, and reduce foreign economic 
dependence.27 Confronting the oil companies, however, would soon become his most 
difficult undertaking.
The passing o f the 1936 Expropriation Law initiated Cardenas’ dispute with the 
oil companies. The law declared M exico's right to expropriate any property needed for 
public use, specifying that compensation be paid within ten years. Under pressure 
from U.S. oil companies, the State Department sought Cardenas’ assurance that the law 
was not targeted at petroleum producers. Cardenas replied that the law only applied to 
those suspended operations vital to the nation's well-being, and therefore did not affect 
petroleum interests. The first application o f the law came against the railroad industry 
(which was largely U.S.-owned). The following year, despite Cardenas' earlier 
promises, the law targeted the oil industry.28 Although both industries were of
26Claudia Anne Finney, "The Good Neighbor Policy and the Standard Oil 
Company of New Jersey: The Case o f Oil Expropriation in Mexico," (M .A. thesis. 
University o f Oregon, 1982), 36.; and Meyer, 148.
27Sociedad Mexicana de Geograffa y Estadfstica, Accion v Pensamiento Vivos 
rte l azaro Cardenas. (Mexico: Federacion Editorial Mexicana, 1973), 15-49.
28David E. Cronon. Josephus Daniels in Mexico. (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1960), 127-28; FRUS 1937. 5:681-83: Meyer. 154; and Julio C. 
Trevino, "Mexico." in Expropriation in the Americas: A Comparative Law Study, ed.
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comparable value, the greater strategic importance o f the oil industry and its more 
powerful lobbying efforts in Washington caused the State Department to give greater 
attention to the petroleum dispute than the plight o f  railroad investors.
The 1936-1938 conflict between sixteen o f  M exico's largest oil companies and 
the Syndicate o f  Oil Workers o f the Mexican Republic (STPRM) became the primary 
catalyst for nationalization. The STPRM desired an industry-wide collective contract 
with the oil companies, which called for many well-deserved demands, and others that 
were blatantly exorbitant and undoubtedly included for bargaining leverage. The 
companies agreed in principle to the idea o f a  collective contract, but insisted that union 
demands far exceeded what the companies were capable of paying. Consequently, the 
STPRM struck. Over the next two years, neither management-labor conventions, 
arbitral reviews, nor appeals to Mexico's Supreme Court resolved the dispute. While 
each government review found unanimously in favor o f  the STPRM, the oil companies 
refused to compromise, believing that Mexico had neither the desire nor ability to run 
the industry. And, in mid-1937, the companies even threatened to halt production until 
it reached more agreeable terms.29 To their surprise, however, a government takeover 
followed in short order.
The true crisis arrived when the oil companies appealed the STPRM's demands 
to M exico's Supreme Court. On 1 March 1938 the Supreme Court upheld earlier 
findings by the Federal Board o f Conciliation and Arbitration's Special Group Seven
Andreas F. Lowenfeld (New York: Dunellen, 1971), 128-30, 134.
29The STPRM was a consolidation o f twenty-one independent oil worker unions. 
Cronon, 161: Bermudez. 12-13.; and Finney. 56.
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that the companies were capable of meeting the STPRM 's demands, and set a 7 March 
deadline for compliance. As last minute negotiations ensued. President Cardenas twice 
extended the deadline. Meanwhile, the companies again threatened to halt production, 
and the Mexican government warned that it would seize their properties. When the 
companies once again refused to comply on 18 March, President Cardenas announced 
his decision to nationalize the sixteen largest oil companies. The legal vehicle was the 
1936 Expropriation Law, which guaranteed full compensation within ten years.50 As 
expected, the U.S. oil companies immediately turned to the State Department for 
diplomatic assistance.
The State Department Response
The Mexican nationalizations highlighted numerous problems for the State 
Department. The Department had a long history o f interposing to aid U.S. oil 
companies obtain favorable conditions and clarification o f Mexican legislation. Also, 
since a  large sum o f money was in dispute, the U.S. companies would undoubtedly 
press hard for diplomatic representation. The nationalization therefore could not go 
uncontested, but the Department would have to weigh its response against the tenets o f 
the Good Neighbor Policy.
Differing camps developed within the Roosevelt administration immediately 
after nationalization as to the appropriate U.S. response. On one side, Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull, Under Secretary Sumner Welles, and several career diplomats
30Although sixteen companies were immediately seized, 40 others (27 of which 
were foreign-owned) were not affected because their employees were not unionized. 
Cronon, 166-67; Meyer. 158-59, 166-169; FRUS 1937. 5:661-64; FRUS 1938 5:725- 
27; Bermudez, 15; and W. Gordon, 95.
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urged that a hard-line approach be used. On the other side, U .S. Ambassador to 
Mexico Josephus Daniels and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau believed the U.S. 
government should remain completely outside the controversy and let the firms resolve 
their own difficulties.31 President Roosevelt would have to make the final decision.
Ambassador Daniels had a profound influence on this debate. The prestigious 
septuagenarian ambassador had served as Secretary o f the Navy under President 
Woodrow Wilson from 1913-1920, with Franklin D. Roosevelt as his Assistant 
Secretary. Both Roosevelt and Daniels had maintained a close friendship since that 
time and, as ambassador to Mexico, Daniels had far more access to the President than 
his rank denoted. Consequently, Daniels appealed directly to Roosevelt when he 
deemed it necessary. At the height o f the Mexican dispute, the Ambassador wrote 
President Roosevelt:
I read last night (I don 't get much time for reading in these hectic 
days) a letter which Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Taft on December 22,
1910: "As I utterly disbelieve in the policy of bluff, in national and 
international affairs, or any violation o f the old frontier maxim: 'Never 
draw unless you mean to shoot,' I do not believe in taking any position 
anywhere unless we can make good ." That sound maxim has present- 
day application.32
31 Fredrick B. Pike, FDR’s Good-Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally 
Gentle Chaos. (Austin: University o f Texas Press. 1995), 192-93; Meyer, 186-87.
32Josephus Daniels letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 April 1938. Josephus 
Daniels Papers. Library o f Congress. Manuscript Reading Room. Washington. D.C
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As the correspondence implies, the Ambassador recommended that his superiors 
exercise patience and flexibility in dealing with Mexico. Meanwhile, he expressed 
little sympathy for the oil companies, which he felt were quite deserving of Mexico's 
actions. W hile Ambassador Daniels endured a  great deal o f criticism for his position, 
others later credited him with having preserved U.S.-Mexican relations during this 
troubled period o f international politics by superseding the wishes o f the oil companies 
for the sake o f longer-range political objectives.33 The road to a  solution, however, 
was not without obstacles.
Despite the Administration's framework o f non-interference, the State 
Department took several initial steps to pressure Mexico into negotiating. The first 
occurred eight days after nationalization, when Department economic adviser Herbert 
Feis recommended that Treasury Secretary M orgenthau suspend the 1936 U.S. silver 
purchasing agreement with Mexico. Feis knew that the sanction would serve mainly as 
a psychological scare, but believed that it could prove effective if the Treasury were to 
lower simultaneously its global purchase price o f  silver, thereby preventing Mexican 
circumvention by selling silver to the United States on the open market. And, in order 
to protect other friendly silver producing countries from the global price reduction, Feis 
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Morgenthau and Daniels both opposed the proposed sanction. While they 
agreed the measure would both weaken the peso and disrupt Mexican mine production, 
they did not believe it would be sufficient to cause the Cardenas administration to 
change direction, nor, in their opinion, was it in the best interest o f long-term U.S.- 
Mexican relations. Moreover, Morgenthau apparently disliked this State Department 
encroachment on Treasury Department domain. The Treasury Secretary insisted he 
would comply with Feis’ plan only if the State Department made a formal request. It 
came the following day. Morgenthau announced cessation o f silver purchases from 
Mexico on 27 March, and lowered the Treasury purchasing price for silver over the 
next two days.j5
The sanction failed for several reasons. First, even though canceling Mexican 
silver purchases did create economic hardship, M exico's determination to withstand 
such pressure rendered Washington's action pointless. Second, despite the global price 
decrease, Mexico still managed to sell some silver to the United States on the open 
market, where the country of origin is unknown. Third, the sanction caused weakening 
of the peso, which reduced Mexican purchases of U .S. goods, thereby harming the 
U.S. economy as well. Finally, the Mexican silver industry was between 70 and 80 
percent U.S.-owned. As potential hostage companies. U.S.-owned mining companies 
feared that they too might face nationalization if such policies continued. Through 
their powerful Washington lobby, the silver producers made it clear that they did not
35Cronon. 190-93; Letter from Daniels to Roosevelt. 29 March 1938, Josephus 
Daniels Papers: and John Morton Blum, From the M orgenthau Diaries: Years of 
Crisis. 1928-1938. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1959), 1:495-96.
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want to suffer because o f oil industry problems. As a result, the Treasury Department 
unofficially rescinded the sanction in the summer o f  1938, with President Roosevelt's 
approval.36
While the silver sanctions were in progress. Secretary Hull prepared a second 
State Department response, an official communique protesting the nationalizations. In 
reviewing the letter, Ambassador Daniels expressed concern to the Secretary that the 
document was too strongly worded, and persuaded the Secretary to modify the tone. 
Then, reluctantly, Daniels delivered the letter on 28 March. President Cardenas' reply 
came two days later, when he informed Daniels that the protest was unacceptable, since 
his government had already expressed, on numerous occasions, its intention to provide 
compensation. Daniels understood that official delivery o f this letter would result in a 
break in diplomatic relations, and, without consulting Department superiors, agreed 
privately with President Cardenas to view the letter as not having been officially 
delivered. The Ambassador then delayed his requested return to Washington for 
consultation until the last possible moment in order to minimize the potential 
importance of the trip. He believed that he could accomplish more by remaining in 
Mexico.37 Few besides Ambassador Daniels could have undertaken such an 
insubordinate course without serious reprimand.
36The silver industry employed over 100,000 Mexicans (versus 16,000 in the oil 
industry) and provided the Mexican government with 10 percent o f its revenue. 
Josephus Daniels, Shirt Sleeve Diplomat. (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina 
Press, 1947), 249-50; Grayson, 17-18; and Blum, 497.
37FRUS 1938. 5:756-57; and Cronon. 197.
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Two other forms o f economic pressure supplemented these initial measures. 
Indirectly, the State Department gave tacit approval to the efforts o f U.S. oil companies 
to discourage Latin American and European nations from purchasing Mexican 
petroleum products. M ore directly, the Department ceased to issue new loans or renew 
current loans to Mexico.38 The declining customer base for petroleum products and 
dwindling bilateral assistance caused considerable economic hardship in Mexico, but 
failed to force the nation into a settlement.
These measures created economic hardship in Mexico. The problems caused by 
the oil boycott, finding new markets, and maintaining production weighed heavily on 
the Cardenas administration. Shortly after nationalization, a power struggle 
exacerbated the crisis. Cardenas had to impress upon the workers the impossibility of 
granting union demands under strained economic conditions.39 If anything, economic 
pressure probably served to further delay Mexico's ability to compensate the 
companies.
Meanwhile, the plight o f British and Dutch investors, whose collective 
petroleum investments were much larger than those o f the United States, demonstrated 
the perils o f pursuing a hard-line policy. Great Britain delivered a note of similar tone 
to the one "unofficially" delivered by Daniels, thereby causing a break in relations in 
May 1938, while the Dutch government showed more patience and managed to
38Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics o f U.S.-Latin American 
Relations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 79. Wood, 228-33.
39Meyer, 181-82.
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maintain diplomatic ties.40 Mexico realized, however, that U.S. strategic concerns 
outweighed Anglo-Dutch commercials interests, and therefore managed to defer 
settlement with the European nations until it first came to terms with the United States.
Between mid-1938 and late 1941, despite frequent consultation with Mexican 
officials in both Mexico City and Washington, the State Department chose not to 
interpose officially in the controversy. The Department hoped that a  series o f 
negotiations between Donald R. Richberg (an attorney representing the U.S. oil 
companies) and the Mexican government could produce a settlement. These talks 
collapsed in November 1939. At the same time, the Department submitted several 
suggestions for compromise and arbitration. Most o f  its proposals called for some 
form o f limited partnership between the oil companies and the Mexican government, 
allowing the companies regularly to extract a percentage o f  revenue until compensation 
was fully paid. Both parties dismissed all proposals for joint ventures and arbitration. 
The Mexican government rejected the concept of a jo int venture because it refused, 
under any condition, to allow the oil companies to return to Mexico. Then, in early 
1940, Mexico asserted that it would not even discuss arbitration because it felt that no 
outside body had authority to adjudicate national policy. The oil companies also 
rejected arbitration or joint ventures, stating they would settle for nothing less than the 
full return o f their properties.41 The dispute had reached an impasse.
" Ib id ., 183-84.
41FRUS 1940. 5:1001-03; Donald R. Richberg, The Mexican Oil Seizure. (New 
York: Arrow Press, 1940), 36-47 passim: and Wood, 239-46.
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The oil companies opted to wait for a  better settlement. With the upcoming 
L940 presidential elections in both the United States and Mexico, they predicted that 
new, more sympathetic governments would come to power. The companies were 
disappointed, however, when the election results in both countries went contrary to 
their desires.42 They now realized that a favorable solution was unlikely.
Between the collapse o f the Richberg talks in November 1939, and the fall o f 
1941, several factors caused Washington to shift its stance toward the Mexican 
nationalization. First, the U.S.-owned Sinclair group broke away from the other oil 
companies and reached a  separate settlement with the Mexican government in May 
1940. Second, the threat of world war, which would also prompt a Bolivian 
settlement, made U .S. cooperation with its closest Latin American neighbor 
imperative. In order to protect the strategically vital Panama Canal, the United States 
wished to obtain military cooperation and establish air bases on Mexican soil. Third, 
Mexico had managed to find new markets for its petroleum in Germany, Italy, Japan, 
and six Latin American nations despite the propaganda campaign and boycott. Finally, 
the United States had made headway in negotiations with Mexico on a number of 
outstanding agrarian claims that had accumulated over the years.43 While the agrarian 
seizures were not considered o f vital importance, and received little diplomatic
42Cardenas-backed Avila Camacho won the presidential race in Mexico, while 
Roosevelt was elected to a third term. Daniels. Shirt Sleeve Diplomat. 260-61.
43J. Richard Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry: 1938-1950. (New York: 
Russell & Russell. 1972), 113; FRUS 1940 5:1056-62; and Lipson, 77.
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attention compared to the oil dispute, progress on these negotiations showed that the 
Mexican government could be reasoned with on the oil issue.
While Mexico rejected the idea o f arbitration, it did propose in March 1940 that 
a U.S.-Mexican commission be established to assess the value o f the oil companies’ 
properties. The Mexican government maintained that such a  valuation had to take 
place before it would even consider discussing compensation. The State Department 
mulled over this proposal for more than a  year, hoping either that Mexico would agree 
to third-party arbitration, or that the oil companies would somehow manage to resolve 
their problems independently. The U.S. companies, however, continued with their 
unrealistic demand for restitution o f the seized properties. Finally, through an 
exchange of notes in November 1941, the Department superseded the companies' 
demands and formally agreed to participate in assessing the value o f the seized 
properties. This step opened the way for a  final settlement by a two-person 
commission. In order to expedite the work o f the commission and prevent further 
complications, both governments decided, in advance, to agree upon a general figure 
for compensation.44 The valuation and behind-the-scenes bargaining ran from July 
through November 1941.
From January through mid-April 1942, a commission headed by Manuel J. 
Zevada from Mexico and Morris L. Cooke from the United States, worked out a joint 
report announcing the final compensation figure, as described in Table 1. The sum of 
$23,995,991 would be owed the oil companies, payable in large part from oil profits
“ Meyer. 222-24.
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Cooke Zevada Agreement, 17 April 1942
Standard Oil Co. o f N ew  Jersey g ro u p ........................................................$18,391,641
Standard Oil Co. o f California g r o u p ............................................................ $3,159,158
Sabalo g ro u p ....................................................................................................... $897,671
Consolidated Oil Co. g r o u p ............................................................................. $630,151
Seaboard Oil Co. g r o u p ....................................................................................  $487,370
Total .................................................................................................... $23,995,991




Cities Service group ...................................................................................... $1,100,000
Mexican Eagle (Royal Dutch-Shell) g ro u p .................................................$81,250,000
Plus interest to date o f  final payment (1 9 6 2 )................................ $49,088,868
Grand total ..................................................................................................$130,338,868
Table 1 Mexican Oil Settlements. Source, Bermudez, 24-26.
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over a  five year period, following a $9 million initial cash payment by Mexico. In 
exchange, Washington agreed to a new silver purchasing agreement with Mexico, 
coupled with Export-Import Bank financing, and currency stabilization measures.45
After reaching this settlement, Secretary of State Cordell Hull pressured the oil 
companies to accept. He informed them that it was the best solution the Department 
could offer and he invited the oil companies to either accept this solution or continue on 
their own. The Secretary made it clear that by declining the Cooke-Zevada 
Agreement, they should no longer expect support from the Department.46 The 
companies deliberated for almost a  year before accepting Mexico's offer, thus ending 
the Mexican controversy eighteen months after the Bolivian settlement.
Conclusion
The most striking policy decision to evolve from the Bolivian and Mexican 
disputes was the U.S. retreat from prompt diplomatic intervention. Under President 
Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, private U.S. companies found they no longer could 
expect unconditional support from the Department o f State to protect their properties 
abroad. This was a clear shift in policy from the Republican administrations that 
preceded Roosevelt.
45Mr. Cooke was an engineer and technical consultant for the Office of 
Production Management. Department o f  State, Department o f State Bulletin, vol. V, 
no. 130 (20 December 1941): 563; Idem, "Payment for Expropriated Petroleum 
Properties." 25 and 29 September 1943. Treaties and Other International Agreements 
o f the United States o f America. 1776-1949. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), 9:1150- 
54.
46Meyer, 224.
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In addition to this new U.S. position, the State Department set several specific 
policy precedents with respect to future conflicts. First, although the Department could 
have intervened more, it decided to remain on the sidelines as long as negotiations were 
taking place and to facilitate communication between both groups. Only after the threat 
o f hemispheric involvement in World War II became overwhelming did the Department 
interpose to break the stalemate in both cases.
Second, even though no official policy or legislation existed concerning 
uncompensated property seizures, the State Department experimented with the 
suspension o f bilateral assistance in both disputes. Curtailment o f  new bilateral 
assistance proved useful, and the State Department would use this policy during every 
dispute that followed. The Department went even further in the Mexican controversy 
by recommending cessation of silver purchases and by aiding U .S. oil companies in 
their boycott o f  Mexican petroleum products. These tactics failed because Mexico 
managed to circumvent the petroleum boycott and the Department soon realized that 
halting silver purchases hurt not only Mexico, but the U.S. economy as well.
Third, the State Department revised U.S. policy toward compensation. In order 
to secure any compensation whatsoever without military intervention, the State 
Department worked out compromises. Since the Bolivian seizure was a confiscation, 
which did not require compensation, the Pefiaranda government had to develop a 
justification for paying Standard Oil which would be palatable to domestic critics. The 
Mexican dispute caused Washington to relax its demand that compensation precede 
nationalization by a host government. Instead, the State Department accepted a smaller 
payment spread out over five years.
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Fourth, the Bolivian and Mexican settlements were accompanied by substantial 
economic and military assistance from the United States. While W orld War II clearly 
played a  role, the offer o f renewed aid undoubtedly prompted both nations to resolve 
these controversies.
In the end, the U.S. policy o f patience and flexibility during a period when 
hemispheric solidarity was crucial, rather than strong-arm tactics (such as economic 
sanctions), encouraged both sides to negotiate settlements. The following cases o f 
Guatemala and Cuba, however, illustrate the failure o f diplomacy to resolve similar 
dilemmas during a dramatically different Cold W ar environment under the Eisenhower 
administration.
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CHAPTER IV 
COLD WAR SEIZURES: GUATEMALA AND CUBA
Fifteen years after the Roosevelt administration confronted the first major 
property seizures in Latin America, the Eisenhower administration encountered new 
seizures in Guatemala in 1953, and later in Cuba in 1959. Whereas Roosevelt had to 
balance his Latin American dealings against the threat o f a  forth-coming global 
conflict, the new bipolar world that emerged from World W ar II shaped Eisenhower’s 
response. Key Latin American policy decisions had to be weighed against possible 
Soviet penetration o f the hemisphere. To ward o ff communism and enhance economic 
stability in the tumultuous days o f the Cold W ar, the White House strongly promoted 
liberalized trade and investment policies throughout the Third World. Developing 
nations were advised to generate growth by offering lucrative climates for foreign 
investors, with "trade not aid" as the motto.1 Such policies clashed with the rising tide 
o f nationalism in the post-war period, particularly in Guatemala and Cuba. Under the 
Eisenhower administration's Cold War policies, the State Department turned away 
from the Good Neighbor Policy, and maintained a hard line stance toward property 
seizures in Latin America.
Guatemala
Guatemala was the first country in the hemisphere to seize U.S. property in the 
post-war era. In 1953 and 1954, the Guatemalan government o f Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzman expropriated land owned by the United Fruit Company. The dollar amount in
•Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America. (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press. 1988), 64-65.
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dispute was minor, yet the State Department became heavily involved. The 
Department's actions reveal that it was more greatly influenced by the association made 
between the Arbenz government and international communism than the seizure of U.S.- 
owned property.
Background
The origin o f the United Fruit Company's interests in Guatemala began with 
Captain Lorenzo Dow Baker, a U.S. merchant, who in 1870 was one o f the first 
entrepreneurs to venture into the Caribbean banana trade. In succeeding years, he 
established the Boston Fruit Company, bought out competitors, and came to dominate 
the banana trade in Central America. Under the new name of the United Fruit 
Company, Baker's enterprise established a  subsidiary in Guatemala in the early 1900s, 
known as the Companfa Agricola. Over the next four decades, the subsidiary 
purchased large tracts o f land, constructed a railroad, and acquired the port facilities of 
Puerto Barrios on the nation's east coast.2 The Guatemalan government approved the 
subsidiary's expansion. Ties between the government and the company were 
particularly close during the administration o f dictator Jorge Ubico Castaneda (1930- 
1944).
The development of a strong nationalist movement eroded public support for the 
Ubico dictatorship in the early 1940s. A revolt led by Guatemala’s small middle class, 
comprised o f  junior officers, middle-level government employees, teachers, and
’T hom as P. McCann, An American Company: The Tragedy o f United Fruit. 
(New York: Crown Publishers, 1976), 15; and Guillermo Toriello, La batalla de 
Guatemala. (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1955), 33-40.
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students, culminated in President Ubico’s ouster in the summer o f 1944. Organizers of 
the movement drafted Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo, a Guatemalan teacher living in 
exile in Argentina, to run as their presidential candidate. Although he had no previous 
political experience, Dr. Arevalo became the nation's first democratically elected 
president in March 1945. He initiated the Guatemalan Revolution with a  promise of 
"agrarian reform , protection o f  labor, a better educational system and consolidation of 
political democracy. "3
Arevalo's government began a program o f agrarian reform which met resistance 
at home and abroad. In addition to sponsoring programs to educate farmers on 
increasing productivity, promote scientific experimentation with new farming 
techniques, and control land rent, his Administration implemented the Law of Forced 
Rental, which enabled peasants to apply for access to unused lands owned by large 
estates.4 These moves nevertheless were quite modest, and only touched the surface of 
the nation's agrarian reform problems.
Arevalo's nationalistic goals faced many obstacles. Although he served out his 
term, he had to devote much o f his time to maintaining political stability and 
suppressing coup attempts. President Harry Truman compounded these problems in 
1948 by embargoing arms transfers to Guatemala to show disapproval o f Guatemala's
3Stephen C. Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of 
the American Coup in Guatemala. (New York: Anchor Press, 1983), 28, 30-31, 37.
“Schlesinger and Kinzer, 41; and Richard H. Immerman. The CIA in 
Guatemala: The Foreign Policy o f Intervention. (Austin: University of Texas Press. 
1982), 52-53.
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political reform measures and its reluctance to take a decidedly pro-Western stance.5 
Thus, Arevalo had little opportunity to fully implement his slated programs.
President Arevalo's moderate reform program was followed by the more 
vigorous social and agrarian reform policies o f  his successor, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. 
The Arbenz administration sponsored the Agrarian Reform Law (Congressional Decree 
900), passed in June 1952, which put him in direct conflict with the United Fruit 
Company. The law asserted the state's right to expropriate large tracts of dormant, 
uncultivated land for redistribution to the peasants.6 Initially, the Agrarian Reform 
Law was used against elite landowners, but in 1953 Arbenz switched his attention to 
the United Fruit Company, the nation's largest single landowner. In March 1953, the 
government announced the expropriation o f 233,973 acres o f  company-owned land on 
Guatemala's Pacific coast at Tiquisate, explaining that the property consisted of 
"unproductive and vacant lands that were o f no real benefit to the company or its 
stockholders."7 It offered as compensation three percent agrarian bonds of twenty-five 
year maturity. Using the company's tax figures from May 1952 to determine monetary
G uatem ala’s refusal to sign the 1947 Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which 
sought to ensure the signatories protection from armed aggression and its alleged 
support for the anti-dictatorial Caribbean Legion, combined with the perceived 
potential for Soviet penetration, were factors influencing Trum an's arms embargo 
decision. For further analysis, see, Immerman, 109-110; Ronald Schneider, 
Communism in Guatemala 1944-54. (New York: Praeger, 1959), 25-31; and 
Schlesinger and Kinzer, 42-45, 104.
'Toriello, 172-73.
departm en t o f State, "Expropriation o f United Fruit Company Property by 
Government o f Guatemala," Department o f  State Bulletin 29, no. 742, (14 September 
1953): 358.
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compensation, the government offered $627,572 in bonds. Arbenz argued the offer 
was fair since the firm had purchased the land at an exceptionally low price and had 
paid very low taxes on it. Moreover, the government considered its agrarian reform 
measures equitable because they affected the properties o f nationals and foreigners 
equally.8 To grant U.S. investors immunity was inadmissible.
The United Fruit Company immediately took issue with the expropriation. It 
appealed directly to the Guatemalan Supreme Court to overturn the measure. The 
company claimed that it had been severely discriminated against, and that compensation 
offered was far below the land's fair market value, which it estimated at nearly $16 
million. One month after the seizure, the Guatemalan Supreme Court decided in favor 
o f the government, thus rejecting United Fruit's appeal to rescind the expropriation. 
Seeing no further hope for legal recourse through Guatemalan courts, the company 
commenced heavy lobbying through its powerful connections in Washington for U.S. 
government assistance.
The State Department Response
The March 1953 seizure added to the Department o f State's growing list o f 
concerns over events in Guatemala. Foremost was Arbenz's left-leaning ideology and 
courtship with domestic communist factions -- a trend which it had monitored 
intensively since 1952. Both the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) recognized that the Soviet Union had, until this point, only served as an
8Ibid.. 357; McCann, 49. Guatemala's policy on discrimination stems from 
Article 21 o f the Republic's constitution which prohibits "all discrimination for reason 
of race, sex. nationality, or political beliefs.” See. Toriello. 176.
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ideological framework for home-grown Guatemalan communism, but feared even the 
mere existence o f  communist parties as a precursor to formal ties with the Soviet bloc, 
giving communism a strong foothold in the Americas.9 These concerns increased U.S. 
antagonism toward Arbenz in 1953 and 1954.
With a  clear understanding o f the Eisenhower administration's perspective, 
United Fruit appealed to Washington for assistance, hoping that direct diplomatic 
pressure would lead either to substantial compensation for, or restitution of, the seized 
property. Its strategy was to exploit Washington's communist fears, which it did 
through a  strong media campaign, direct consultation with high-level officials through 
personal contacts, and distribution o f a periodic newsletter to State Department 
personnel on Guatemalan political events.10 The company reasoned that concentrating 
on the issue o f communism rather than the protection o f a multinational corporation 
would accomplish the goal o f restoring favorable business conditions to Guatemala, 
without further tarnishing the company's corporate image in Latin America.
9The Soviet Union had only established formal diplomatic relations with 
Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay by 1953. Rabe, Eisenhower in Latin America. 91- 
92.
10There were several close ties between the administration and United Fruit. 
Allen and John Foster Dulles, for example, had previously represented the company as 
members of Sullivan & Cromwell, a Wall Street law firm. Special Assistant to the 
President for national security affairs Robert Cutler and U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill 
were among the other government officials with ties to United Fruit. Ed Whitman, the 
husband of President Eisenhower's personal secretary, Ann W hitman, worked as 
United Fruit's public relations chief during the 1950s, as did former Senator Robert 
LaFollette and former Under Secretary of State Spruille Braden. Also, United Nations 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge had previously represented United Fruit’s home state 
o f Massachusetts as a U.S. senator, and continued to be a company stockholder. See 
McCann, 55-58; Immerman, 115, 124-25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
The Guatemalan President did little to dispel these fears. Arbenz undeniably 
afforded the communists significant attention, in part as a means o f repayment for their 
political and campaign support. He allowed the communists to form official parties, 
and appointed several acknowledged communists to political positions, but there is little 
indication that Arbenz was, himself, a com m unist." He did. however, seriously 
misjudge the political climate in Washington, and his failure to allay U.S. concerns in 
the midst o f the Cold W ar proved fatal to the Guatemalan Revolution.
The State Department soon responded to United Fruit's complaints. When the 
company submitted a detailed explanation o f its position to the Department in mid- 
1953, the Department in turn, officially presented these points to the Guatemalan 
Ambassador in Washington on 28 August 1953.12 The aide-memoire was the most 
significant formal correspondence to exchange hands over the seizure dispute.
As outlined in this communication, the Department upheld several of United 
Fruit’s points o f contention. First, it asserted that the bonds constituted neither 
adequate nor prompt compensation. Due to the low annual interest rate o f only three 
percent, and the uncertainty o f their market value upon maturation, the bonds offered 
were inadequate. Furthermore, the compensation offer was by no means prompt, since 
the twenty-five year maturation period would expire in 1978, by which time few of the 
company's current shareholders would realize direct benefit. Second, the company
"Despite Arbenz's ties to the left, he appointed no known communists to 
cabinet or sub-cabinet level posts. Schneider, 22-25.
l2For full text o f the aide-memoir, see Department of State, "Expropriation of 
United Fruit Company Property by Government o f  Guatemala.” 358-60.
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disagreed with using the land's assessed tax value in determining appropriate 
compensation. United Fruit claimed that the disputed land, purchased between L928 
and 1930, had been undeveloped and properly assessed for taxation purposes.
Although Guatemalan law required a reassessment o f land taxes every five years, from 
1930 to 1950, no appraisals were made. United Fruit finally hired its own appraisers 
in 1951. The government, however, failed to enter the results into the nation's official 
tax register, or explain why. M oreover, the government did not permit the company to 
analyze the appraisal documents prior to expropriation, as required under Guatemalan 
law. Thus, when expropriation occurred in 1953, the tax value utilized was based on 
the land's assessed value from over twenty years prior. Third, the company claimed 
that the land taken could not be justly classified as "uncultivated land” because it had 
provided both pasture and forestry uses. The company maintained that it annually 
extracted from the region large quantities o f lumber and materials used to further 
banana production. It also leased portions o f this land to its employees who produced 
fruits, vegetables, and raised cattle for private consumption. Fourth, the expropriated 
land was vital to the Compaiifa Agricola as an alternative resource to ensure against the 
Panama disease, which had. in the past, destroyed 7,000 acres o f company land, 
forcing abandonment o f the infected property.13 Consequently, the company held that 
retention of vast acreage was economically necessary and justifiable.
The State Department added a few points o f its own to United Fruit's claims. 
Although it acknowledged the legality o f expropriations that affected both foreign and
13Ibid., 358-59. See also. Cable from Leddy to Cabot and Mann. 26 February 
1953. 714.00/2-2653. RG 59.
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domestic property owners equally, it questioned the accuracy o f Arbenz's assertion that 
the expropriation was non-discriminatory in nature. A t the time of the Tiquisate 
expropriation, the Department noted, approximately two-thirds of the total amount of 
land expropriated had belonged to United Fruit. M oreover, ratification o f a  new plan 
would result in expropriation of an additional 172.532 acres o f company land on the 
Atlantic coast. This action would weaken Guatemalan claims o f non-discrimination. 
The Department emphasized that such discriminatory actions toward foreigners or their 
property violated international law.14
Over the next several months, the State Department suggested to the 
Guatemalan government several means o f settlement, including direct negotiation and 
arbitration. Arbenz initially rejected these proposals, but changed his mind after six 
months o f increased political and economic pressure from Washington. On 9 February 
1954 (three weeks before the Tenth Inter-American Conference) Guatemalan Foreign 
Minister Guillermo Toriello proposed that the dispute be referred to a neutral 
commission for settlement. In response, U.S. Ambassador John E. Peurifoy, following 
instructions from the State Department, relayed several points to Minister Toriello. 
First, the Ambassador expressed the Department’s preference that the issue be resolved 
through direct negotiation between the company and the Guatemalan government. 
Second, Ambassador Peurifoy lectured the Foreign M inister on the ease with which 
U.S. companies had resolved past disputes through direct discussion with other Latin 
American governments. Third, he informed the Foreign Minister that the need for
l4Ibid.
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resolving the dispute was a  factor of "high, but not primary importance" in U.S.- 
Guatemalan relations.15 This final point seems to indicate that communism was now of 
greater concern to Washington than the United Fruit dispute. Diplomatic relations had 
deteriorated to the point where settlement o f  the United Fruit dispute would no longer 
suffice to change the Eisenhower administration’s impression o f Guatemala. The 
situation remained deadlocked until mid-1954.
Less than a week after Guatemala City and Washington had failed to reach a 
compromise, the Arbenz government announced its second expropriation decision 
affecting United Fruit land. The new announcement called for expropriation of 
173,790 acres o f  Compama Agricola's land on the Atlantic coast, in Bananera. In 
compensation Guatemala offered $557,542, also in the form o f long-term low interest 
bonds.16 A strong diplomatic response from Washington was inevitable.
One month later, the State Department filed a  formal claim against Guatemala 
on behalf o f  United Fruit. The 20 April 1954 communique announced that Guatemala 
owed $6,984,223 plus $8,737,600 in severance damages for the Tiquisate seizure.17 
The fact that only one year had passed before official Department espousal of a claim 
illustrates the Eisenhower administration's greater willingness to interpose in the 
Guatemalan case.
lsCable from Dulles to Peurifoy, 20 February 1954, 714.00/2-954, RG 59.
16Toriello, 40.
17Department of State. "Formal Claim Filed Against the Guatemalan 
Government," Department o f  State Bulletin 30. no. 775 (3 May 1954): 678-79.
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The State Department implemented no formal sanctions against Guatemala in 
response to the United Fruit dispute, but it did display its dissatisfaction with Arbenz's 
policies by bringing economic and political pressures to bear on the country. President 
Eisenhower continued the embargo on military aid begun by the Truman 
administration.18 The United States subsequently curtailed bilateral economic assistance 
to Guatemala between 1952 (after enactment o f the Agrarian Reform Law) and 1954, 
as shown in Figure 2. Seizure o f U.S.-owned property solidified support for these 
policies. Additionally, as a natural response to the Agrarian Reform Law, and 
requiring little encouragement from Washington, private investors promptly withdrew 
over $12 million from Guatemala in 1952 and 1953.19 The seizure of U.S.-owned 
property solidified support for the Administration's actions, while capital flight placed 
increased pressure on Guatemala’s economy.
With differences between the two nations growing increasingly acute in 1954, 
the State Department used the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas to exert 
further political pressure on the left-leaning Arbenz government. Although the March 
1954 Conference was intended as an economic summit, the State Department 
successfully lobbied to alter the agenda, adding a proposed declaration denouncing 
communism in the Americas, with Guatemala as the implied target. In preparing for 
the Conference, Secretary Dulles reminded his staff to avoid discussion o f  United 
Fruit's difficulties, because he feared the Guatemalan delegates would attempt to defeat
18Cable from Clark to Mann, 4 December 1952, 714.00/11-2252. RG 59.
I9Department o f Commerce "Guatemalan Economic Trend Downward." Foreign 
Commerce Weekly 50. no. 26 (28 December 1953): 4.
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Figure 2 U.S. Bilateral Economic Assistance to Guatemala, 1946-1961. Source: 
AID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Series of Yearly Data. (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1991).
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the anti-communist measure by linking U.S. actions to the fruit company's interests. 
The Secretary correctly anticipated the Guatemalan response, but the conferees 
nevertheless overwhelmingly approved his anti-communist declaration.20 The Caracas 
Declaration gave Washington a  license to exert greater pressure on the Arbenz 
government.
Arbenz could not reverse the tide. His prediction two years earlier that 
Guatemala would be subjected to "terrific pressure [to] readjust the government's 
policy toward communism" exceeded his expectations, as it ultimately led to his 
overthrow in June 1954.21 Arbenz had neither the military support or popular backing 
needed to save his presidency.
The full extent o f  U.S. involvement in the Arbenz overthrow is still under 
debate. W hat is known for certain is that an exiled Guatemalan army colonel, Carlos 
Enrique Castillo Armas, with a  small group o f arm ed rebels known as the Liberation 
Army, managed successfully to enter Guatemala and execute a virtually bloodless coup. 
Arbenz opted to cede his position peacefully rather than risk confrontation with forces 
o f unknown size and strength, especially given that his own army declined to come to 
his defense. It is also known that the State Department had been approached on several 
occasions with proposals designed to topple the Arbenz government, and that it did 
wish to see Arbenz replaced. The most likely scenario is that the U.S. government and
20The U.S. declaration passed by a vote o f  seventeen to one. Guatemala cast the 
only negative vote, Argentina and Mexico abstained, and Costa Rica gave a supporting 
vote in absentia. For text o f the declaration, see. Department o f State, Intervention o f 
International Communism in Guatemala. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1954), 8-9.
2ICable from Clark to Mann, 4 December 1952. 714.00/11-2252. RG 59.
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anti-Arbenz neighboring nations at a minimum provided logistical support for the 
Liberation Army to commence operations, and that inaction by Guatemala’s regular 
army during the assault sealed Arbenz’s f a te .22
The United States and Guatemala moved quickly to re-establish friendly 
relations following the coup. Among President Castillo Arm as' first acts were 
annulment o f  Arevalo's 1945 Constitution, abrogation o f  A rbenz's Agrarian Reform 
Law, and restitution o f United Fruit's expropriated lands. Armas then moved to 
eradicate communism from Guatemala by establishing the National Committee for 
Defense Against Communism, and by dismantling trade unions and peasant 
movements.23 In exchange, Washington dramatically altered its policies toward 
Guatemala. The United States lifted its embargo on military assistance following the 
coup, and military aid to Guatemala rose to $3.7 million by 1963.24 Concurrently,
22For coup proposals see, Meeting between Corcoran and Mann, 15 May 1950. 
714.00/5-1550; Cable from Siracusa to Mann, 4 September 1952, 714.00/8-2952, RG 
59; Cable from Mann to Secretary Dulles, 3 October 1952, 714.00/10-352, RG 59; 
and Cable from Mann to Whelan, 13 October 1952, 714.00/10-1352, RG 59. Also, 
there are varying interpretations as to the factors that led to Arbenz’s overthrow. See. 
Immerman, 133-86; Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in 
Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History. 14, no. 1 (Winter 
1990): 67-86; and Stephen G. Rabe, "The Clues Didn’t Check Out: Commentary on 
'The CIA and Castillo Arm as,'" Diplomatic History. 14. no. 1 (Winter 1990): 87-95: 
Paul C. Clark, Jr., The United States and Somoza. 1933-1956: A Revisionist Look. 
(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 182-84; and Schlesinger and Kinzer, 159-204.
23Johnathan Fried et. al., Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History. (New 
York: Grove Press, 1983), 62.
24Guatemala: A Country Study, ed. Richard F. Nyrop, 2d ed. (Washington. 
D.C.: GPO. 1983), 132.
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U.S. bilateral economic and social aid rose to the highest level ever, with Washington 
contributing $110 million between 1955 and 1960 (see Figure 2 above).
Both the State Department and the United Fruit Company achieved their short­
term objectives. Whereas the Department witnessed the successful ouster o f  an 
unwelcome leftist-oriented Central American government. United Fruit realized its goal 
o f restitution of its former property. Relief was, however, only temporary. Successive 
governments in Guatemala failed to prosper despite the massive infusion o f bilateral 
assistance, accentuated by increased maldistribution o f income during the 1960s and 
severe political disorder through the early 1970s. The failures o f this hard-line State 
Department policy were not yet apparent when the next crisis emerged in Fidel Castro's 
Cuba.
Culm
Five years after the Guatemalan coup, the State Department encountered its 
biggest Cold War challenge in Latin America. The 1959 victory of Fidel Castro 
ultimately resulted in the loss of nearly $2 billion by private U.S. investors. Unlike the 
previous case studies, the Cuban seizures did not all occur simultaneously, nor did they 
affect just a handful o f large companies within a particular industry. Instead, the 
Cuban example reveals gradual nationalization o f an entire economy.
Background
Foreign investors had prospered in pre-Castro Cuba, particularly under the 
dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista Zaldfvar (1952-1959), who in many ways mirrored the 
earlier Diaz government in Mexico and the Ubico government in Guatemala. While 
Batista welcomed foreign investment, his policies exacerbated the massive disparity
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between wealthy and poor Cubans and his administration also showed signs o f 
mismanagement and corruption. By 1958 U.S. investors controlled much o f the 
nation’s arable land, and several key industries and public utilities, totaling $861 
million. The United States was also Cuba’s chief trading partner, purchasing $484 
million o f its exports and providing $546 million in imports.25
Although the United States benefitted from Cuba’s inviting investment climate 
and supported Batista in his earlier years, the State Department grew increasingly 
antagonistic toward the dictator by late 1958. Both Batista's use o f increasingly harsh 
measures to quell domestic opposition and his clear involvement in the fraudulent 
national elections o f November 1958 contributed to the shift in Department policy. 
Thus, less than one month after the elections, U.S. Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith 
announced W ashington's complete withdrawal o f support for the Batista regim e.26 The 
Department hoped that a reform-minded, yet moderate government would come to 
power.
The government that supplanted Batista on I January 1959 proved far from 
moderate. A long history o f U.S. dominance over Cuba's internal affairs since its 
independence from Spain in 1899, and Washington’s support for consecutive corrupt
^In  comparison, the United States had an estimated $781 million o f direct 
investment in Mexico and $517 million in Argentina in 1958. Department o f 
Commerce, "Capital Flow to Foreign Countries Slackens," Survey o f Current Business 
39, no. 8 (August 1959): 30; idem. Survey of Current Business 38. no. 12 (December 
1958): S21-S22; idem. Survey of Current Business 39. no. 12 (December 1959): S21- 
S22.
26Rabe. Eisenhower in Latin America. 121.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
and inept Cuban governments contributed, in pan. to the hostile environment between 
the United States and Cuba that began in 1959 and continues today.
Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz spearheaded the victorious 26th o f July Movement, 
which for over six years had struggled to oust the Batista regime. The Revolution's 
agenda called for attacking Western capitalism head-on. Purging the Batista military 
and bureaucratic structure were immediate priorities, and both bodies were replaced 
with loyal revolutionary followers. Then came more difficult economic and political 
tasks. The Revolution's economic program called for radical agrarian reform and 
nationalization, both o f which initially targeted public utilities, but soon expanded to 
include every sector. Finally, freeing Cuba from U .S . dependence was viewed as a 
prerequisite for these reforms. The Castro government had no preconceived plan for 
offsetting U.S. economic and political dominance (a Cuban-Soviet alliance was still 
over one year away), but it nevertheless forged ahead with its agenda.27 In the 
meantime, the unwavering loyalty o f the Cuban masses enabled the new government to 
withstand intense economic and political pressure from abroad.
To Washington’s dismay, over the succeeding three years Castro adopted a 
reform policy unprecedented in Latin America. National control over public utilities 
ranked high on the new government’s agenda. Castro first intervened in the operations 
o f an International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) subsidiary, the Cuban Telephone 
Company, in March 1959. Both Washington and ITT reacted mildly to the 
intervention, believing it was only temporary, and that official diplomatic response
27Louis A. Perez, Jr., Cuba and the. United States; Ties o f Singular Intimacy. 
(Athens: University o f Athens Press, 1990). 23 and 245.
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would have been premature.28 The ITT seizure, however, proved only a sample of 
things to come.
Castro next moved to equalize land distribution through the Agrarian Reform 
Law, promulgated in May 1959. It limited the size o f all landholdings and provided 
twenty-year 4.5 percent bonds as compensation, payable in nonconvertible exchange. 
Under the act, hundreds of agrarian seizures took place over the following eighteen 
months, few o f which complied with established policy. The National Institute of 
Agrarian Reform (INRA), the organization responsible for carrying out the 
expropriations, "arbitrarily" enacted the law and designed each decision to meet the 
government's current desires.29 The affected U .S. property owners promptly expressed 
their difficulties to the State Department.
As external political and economic pressure mounted against revolutionary 
measures in early 1960, the Castro government located an alternate market for exports, 
and a  new source of machinery, basic goods, and military hardware in the Soviet 
Union. Nikita Khrushchev’s government had, since the beginning of the Cuban 
Revolution, watched Castro's anti-capitalist and anti-U.S. gestures with great interest. 
Although another year would pass before Castro publicly announced his allegiance to 
Marxism, the Soviet government felt confident enough in the survivability and
28Michael W. Gordon, The. Cuban Nationalization; The Demise o f Foreign 
Private Property. (Buffalo: William S. Hein & C o.. 1976), 73-74.
29For a detailed analysis o f the Agrarian Reform Law, see, cable from Bash to 
Secretary Dillon. 9 October 1959. 837.16/10-959. RG 59: and M. Gordon. 75-76.
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ideological commitment o f the Revolutionary government to re-establish diplomatic 
relations in May I960.30 The move came not a moment too soon for Cuba.
Two weeks after rapproachment with the Soviet Union, Castro initiated a chain 
o f events which permanently damaged U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations. On 23 May 
Castro ordered Cuba's foreign-owned oil refineries to refine Soviet crude oil. The 
U.S. and British-owned companies refused, with the approval o f their respective 
governments.31 Castro responded by seizing the refineries, thereby sparking 
increasingly severe reactions, making severance of diplomatic ties inevitable.
Cuba’s intervention in the operations o f the foreign-owned oil refineries marked 
the high point o f the property seizures. The nationalizations had, by m id-1960, 
covered the entire spectrum of the Cuban economy, ranging from land seizures to 
manufacturing enterprises and public utilities. Castro’s actions put State Department 
decision-makers to the greatest test thus-far.
The State Department Response
The State Department reacted to the Batista overthrow with guarded optimism.
It granted official recognition to the Castro government on 6 January 1959, and 
promptly sought recommendations from its embassy in Havana as to the outlook for
30Richard E. Welch, Jr. Response to Revolution: The United States and the 
Cuban Revolution. 1959-1961. (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press,
1985), 10-15; and Memorandum from Braddock to State Department, 18 February 
1959, 611.37/2-1859, RG 59. Batista had severed diplomatic ties soon after taking 
over in 1952. For more information, see, Peter G. Bourne, Fidel: A Biography of 
Fidel Castro. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1986), 198-99.
31Pamela S. Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy. (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986). 
41-42; and Philip W. Bonsai, Cuba. Castro, and the United States. (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 1971), 151-53.
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U.S.-Cuban relations. Embassy Charge d'Affairs Daniel M. Braddock responded in 
mid-February with a positive analysis. He predicted that Castro's criticism o f the 
United States and foreign investment would eventually subside. After a period of 
adjustment, Braddock believed that Castro would prove a refreshing and welcomed 
change from the Batista government. Tw o days later, the State Department gave its 
initial endorsement to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposal for economic 
assistance to C uba.32 Clearly, Braddock underestimated Castro's commitment to 
change.
In early March, the State Department replaced Ambassador Smith with the more 
progressive Philip Bonsai, who appeared to be a good choice for the job. His 
successful tour as Ambassador to Bolivia had familiarized him with the dilemmas 
facing leftist governments. Bonsai recognized that the traditional view o f Cuba as a 
U .S. dependency had to be revised, and he urged the State Department to exercise 
patience and flexibility in dealing with the new government. The Department followed 
these recommendations during the first year o f the Castro government, and took a 
conciliatory posture toward Cuba.33 Unfortunately, as later events revealed, Bonsai's 
new outlook could do little to alleviate deep-seated Cuban bitterness over decades of 
U.S. interference in its political and economic affairs.
32Memorandum from Braddock to Department o f State, 18 February 1959, 
611.37/2-1859; and Memorandum from Snow to Dillon, 20 February 1959, 837.13/2- 
2059, RG 59.
33Welch, 29: and Bonsai. 25-30.
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When Castro made his first move against U.S.-owned property by seizing the 
Cuban Telephone Company in March 1959, Ambassador Bonsai recommended that the 
Department not file an official protest. Instead, he assisted company officials by 
expressing their grievances, informally, to the Cuban government.34 This effort had 
little impact on the seizure.
When Cuba enacted the Agrarian Reform Law two months later, the 
Ambassador sent his first official note to the Cuban Foreign Minister voicing concern 
over the potential impact o f  the government's reforms on foreign-owned property. His 
11 June note expressed support for the nation's agrarian reform measures, but reminded 
the government o f the need for just compensation and non-discrimination toward U.S.- 
owned properties. As the year progressed, the State Department witnessed the apparent 
arbitrary nature o f the agrarian seizures, few o f which complied with the Agrarian 
Reform Law. As a result, Bonsai delivered another note to President Osvaldo Dorticos 
Torrado on 12 October, followed by a summary note on 27 October, protesting the 
manner in which the seizures were being handled." These protests had no deterrent 
effect on the Cuban government, and the pace o f nationalization continued to increase.
The true turning point in U.S.-Cuban relations occurred late in early 1960. On 
4 March, the French freighter La Coubre, loaded with a  shipment o f Belgian arms, 
exploded suddenly inside a  busy Cuban harbor. Castro promptly accused the United 
States o f sabotage, a charge which the State Department emphatically denied. The
^Blasier, 90.
5SBlasier. 90-91. For text of the June 11th note, see. Note from Bonsai to 
Minister o f State Agramonte, 11 June 1959. 837.16/6-1159. RG 59.
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Castro accusation, combined with the foreign property seizures, and the growing 
consensus in Washington that Cuba was indeed turning communist, contributed to the 
shift in Department policy. Even Ambassador Bonsai gave up hope for continued 
cordial diplomatic relations. Moreover, 1960 was an election year in the United States, 
and Vice President Richard Nixon, running for the Presidency, had increased anti- 
Castro rhetoric during the course o f the cam paign/6 Since the Eisenhower 
administration no longer saw any benefit from trying to cooperate with the Cuban 
government, it shifted its attention to removing Castro by force.
While United States developed paramilitary plans, C astro 's assault on foreign- 
owned property continued. The on-going agrarian seizures and sporadic industrial 
seizures were promptly overshadowed by the dispute over foreign-owned oil refineries 
in the summer o f 1960. Washington considered Castro's demand that private 
petroleum refineries process Soviet crude oil intolerable, and advised the companies to 
refuse his request. When Cuba retaliated by seizing the foreign companies between 29 
June and 2 July, the White House responded by striking Cuba at its weakest point -  
sugar exportation. After the U.S. Congress quickly transferred authority over the sugar 
quota to the Executive branch on 6 July, President Eisenhower announced the following 
day a nearly total reduction in Cuba's sugar quota for the remainder o f I960.37
36Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait. (New York: Avon Books, 1986), 568-
71.
37The potential impact of the sugar sanction was tremendous. Approximately 
700,000 tons of Cuban sugar (almost one-quarter o f the year’s harvest) was no longer 
bound for the United States, leaving only 39,752 tons for the rest o f  1960. At this 
stage, the Eisenhower administration gave no indication as to what it would do to the 
1961 quota. M. Gordon. 98-99.
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Renewed Cuban-Soviet economic relations saved Cuba, and allowed Castro to 
increase pressure on the United States. The U .S .S .R . announced immediately that it 
would exchange equipment, technical assistance, and military aid for Cuban sugar.
The new market for Cuban goods enabled Castro to strike back at the United States by 
implementing the Law of Nationalization. The law authorized expropriation of U .S.- 
owned property at Castro’s discretion, providing compensation through ’’proceeds" 
from sugar sales to the United States. However, to be eligible for compensation, sales 
had to exceed 1.5 million Spanish long tons annually at more than 5.75C per pound. 
Upon meeting these criteria, twenty-year, two percent bonds would be issued. The 
Law of Nationalization clearly was designed to bring about a reversal o f the sugar 
sanction. If this failed, Castro implied that U .S. investors should not expect 
compensation for seized properties.38 At this point, the two nations were not willing to 
resolve their differences. The State Department could only watch and keep records of 
the remaining seizures.
The new year brought an end to U .S.-Cuban diplomatic relations. On 2 January 
1961 Castro demanded that the U .S. Embassy in Havana be reduced from eighty-seven 
to eleven officials within forty-eight hours. In response, Eisenhower announced on 3 
January, with incoming President John F. Kennedy's approval, a break in diplomatic 
and consular relations with Cuba, accompanied by a revised sugar quota of zero for
58Cuba's quantity and price demands for sugar exportation to the United States 
were at inflated World War II levels, and hence unacceptable to the White House. 
Bonsai, 151-52.
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1961. By the end o f 1961, the Kennedy administration had imposed a total embargo on 
trade with Cuba.39 Neither diplomatic nor trade relations have since been resumed.
Although there was no longer hope o f a  diplomatic solution to U.S.-Cuban 
difficulties, the Kennedy administration continued with plans created under President 
Eisenhower to settle differences militarily. Kennedy and his advisors had hoped to 
conduct an amphibious assault, using more than 1400 U .S.-trained Cuban exiles, which 
would be followed by a  mass uprising o f the Cuban people against Castro. The April 
1961 assault, known as the Bay of Pigs invasion, was plagued with tactical and 
logistical errors, as the United States grossly underestimated the determination and 
preparedness o f the Cuban people.'*0 The Castro government successfully resisted the 
invasion, and solidified domestic support.
Washington's problems over the Cuban nationalizations did not end with the 
severance o f diplomatic relations and Bay of Pigs fiasco because the U.S. government 
had to contend with several thousand outstanding claims. To help resolve these claims, 
the 1964 Congress empowered the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) 
with authority to assess the legitimacy and exact dollar amount owed U.S. private 
investors. The FCSC had been established in 1954 as a "quasi-judicial” independent 
U .S. government agency that combined both the State Department's War Claims 
Settlement Commission and the International Claims Settlement Commission under one 
institution. The Commission had previously determined compensation due victims of
39Welch, 8, 59.
'“’Welch, 64-86. For more detailed coverage, see, Peter Wyden, Bay o f Pigs:
The Untold Story. (New York: Simon & Schuster. 1979).




Number Filed 1146 7670 8816
Amount Claimed $2,855,993,212 $490,413,058 $3,346,406,271
Dismissed/ ----- 1710 ------
Number Denied 248 947 1195
Amount Denied $1,277,494,373 $269,363,329 $1,546,857,702
Number Awarded 898 5013 5911
Amount Awarded $1,578,498,839 $221,049,729 $1,799,548,568
Table 2 Final Statistical Report on Cuban Claims Program. Source. Foreign Claims 
Settlement Commission, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 1972 Annual Report. 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1973), 412.
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nationalization in several countries, including Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and 
Poland. The Commission's task in the Cuban case was to ascertain the amount o f  each 
claim and deliver to the Executive branch a  report on compensation owed by the Cuban 
government, as illustrated in Table 2.41 The FCSC review did not result in an actual 
transfer o f U .S. government funds to private investors as compensation, but rather, 
provided the State Department with an official lump sum which it could in turn present 
to the Cuban government a t a  future date if the two governments were ever to resume 
official communication.
More recently, the United States moved again to pressure the Castro 
government. After a February 1996 incident in which the Cuban military shot down 
two civilian planes belonging to the anti-Castro Brothers to the Rescue movement, 
Congress responded in early March by passing the Helms-Burton Act, which enables 
U.S. claimants to sue foreign companies to obtain compensation for their seized 
assets.42 It remains to be seen whether any U.S. claimants will actually be
4IThe FCSC tallied 5,911 outstanding claims totaling $1,799,548. 568. not 
including interest. While a  few of the larger corporations have since recouped their 
losses through tax write-offs, several thousand claims remain uncompensated. For 
more information, see. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Claims o f U .S. Nationals Against the 
Government o f Cuba. 88th Cong., 2d sess., 28, 29 July and 4 August 1964, 1-14, 121: 
and Kirby Jones. "The Issue o f Claims as Seen by the United States," in Subject to 
Solution: Problems in Cuban-U.S. Relations, ed. Wayne S. Smith and Esteban Morales 
Dominguez (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 70.
42Carla Anne Robbins and Jose de Cordoba, “Clinton backs Bill to Tighten 
Cuba Em bargo,” Wall Street Journal. 29 February 1996, p. A3: Anthony DePalma, 
“New U.S. Curbs Sound Alarm for Cuba Investors,” New York Times. 6 April 1996. 
p. A3: and Anne Swardson. “Allies Irked by Bill to Deter their Trade with U.S.
Foes,” Washington Post. 7 March 1996. p. A20.
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compensated under this new policy, but the measure demonstrates that this sensitive 
chapter in U.S.-Cuban relations is far from over.
Conclusion
The Eisenhower administration's Cold W ar fears over the spread o f  communism 
within the hemisphere influenced State Department policy toward Guatemala and Cuba 
more than the U.S. property seizures. The Guatemalan case clearly illustrates this 
because o f the minimal value o f property loss. This was particularly clear in the 
Guatemalan dispute where the dollar amount in question was minuscule. The 
Department certainly would not have risked international uproar and potential 
estrangement o f Latin American allies stemming from discovery of U.S. involvement 
in a coup designed solely to restore United Fruit property. The company did, however, 
heighten tension by providing seemingly irrefutable evidence o f Guatemala's 
communist orientation. The State Department’s quandary over Cuba was more 
complex. State Department officials were cautious initially, not knowing what to 
expect from the Revolution. As the dispute reached the crisis stage, the Department 
realized that its options were either to continue watching passively as Castro enacted his 
reform programs, in order to preserve diplomatic relations, or to risk confrontation in 
hopes of causing an uprising that would replace Castro with a more agreeable 
government. While remaining conciliatory might have preserved bilateral relations. 
Washington's actions revealed the general consensus among State Department and other 
Administration officials that the United States had a better chance of returning to the 
status quo ante by opposing Castro. In pursuing confrontation, the U.S. government 
greatly underestimated Castro and the strength and determination of his following.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
To further its aims, the State Department used economic and political pressure 
during both disputes. Against Guatemala, the United States upheld an embargo on 
military assistance, gradually curtailed economic assistance, and attacked the Arbenz 
government indirectly at the Tenth Inter-American Conference. After Arbenz's 
overthrow, the Department rewarded President Armas' pro-U.S. policies with large 
bilateral assistance packages. Against Cuba, the United States not only withdrew 
economic assistance, but also dismantled the sugar quota, which it hoped would hurt 
the country's most vital export. U.S. actions against Guatemala helped to destabilize 
the government, while its actions against Cuba only served to expedite estrangement 
and gravitation toward the Soviet bloc. Political conditions in Cuba precluded a 
successful repeat o f earlier events in Guatemala.
The State Department did nothing extraordinary in either property seizure 
dispute. It debated few technical or legal issues, and neither controversy actually 
proceeded to the negotiating stage, where the State Department would normally have 
provided assistance to encourage continued dialogue and a prompt settling of 
differences. The Department acted in both seizures to forward diplomatic notes o f 
protest to its foreign counterparts.
The State Department did, however, file formal claims against both countries.
In April 1954, it filed a formal claim against Guatemala for nearly $7 million plus 
$8,700,000 in severance damages. Official Department involvement came only one 
year after the Arbenz expropriation announcement. The United States also compiled a 
list o f outstanding claims against Cuba, totaling S l.8  billion, not including interest, but 
long after diplomatic ties had been severed. More than three decades later, the U.S.
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government moved again to pressure Cuba with the Helms-burton Act, which allows 
U.S. claimants to sue foreign companies that presently own their former properties. It 
is at present too early to tell what political and commercial impact this measure will 
have on Cuba. Should diplomatic relations be restored, it is unlikely that any 
remaining claims will ever be repaid by a  future Cuban government, which 
undoubtedly will be hard-pressed economically. Instead, the Department will probably 
maneuver around the compensation issue, explaining the overriding importance of 
encouraging democracy and liberalized trade and investment policies in Cuba.
Fundamentally, the Cold W ar property disputes were poor examples o f  how 
such crises should be handled. The Department's experience in Cuba, and to a lesser 
extent in Guatemala, would lead to a revised overall policy toward Latin America 
under Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and the creation of legislation designed 
specifically to combat future property seizures.
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CHAPTER V 
POST-CUBAN COLD WAR SEIZURES: 
PERU AND CHILE
U.S. policies toward the issues o f  development and protection o f private sector 
investment in Latin America underwent revision in the aftermath of the Cuban 
experience. On the development side, the Kennedy administration initiated a new 
outlook by pledging a decade o f increased U.S. economic assistance to the region under 
the Alliance for Progress program, which promoted both economic and social 
improvements and the emergence o f  stable democratic governments throughout Latin 
America. Meanwhile, the Legislative branch altered mechanisms for protecting private 
property. Early in the decade, the U .S . Congress took its first step by implementing 
legislation requiring mandatory, time-sensitive Executive branch retaliation against 
uncompensated property seizures. Toward the end o f the decade, Congress moved 
again to protect U.S.-owned property by creating a mixed public-private sector 
corporation that would insure investments in developing regions.
These new mechanisms for encouraging development and discouraging 
disruptions of free enterprise influenced the State Department’s response to property 
seizures that began in 1968 in Peru and 1970 in Chile. The Department's challenge in 
the post-Cuba era would be to protect private investment from pervasive Latin 
American nationalism and avoid another socialist revolution.
Peru
Between 1968 and 1974, Peru’s military government initiated a national 
development program which involved seizing dozens of domestically and foreign-
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owned enterprises in the extractive, banking, and agricultural sectors, as well as several 
public utilities. The government came to terms with most o f  the seized enterprises.
The most contentious and widely publicized o f the unsettled disputes was the 1968-69 
seizure o f the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a subsidiary o f  the Standard Oil 
Company o f New Jersey. The IPC issue gained notoriety because o f the long history 
o f the dispute, the dollar amount involved, the importance o f  the company, and the fact 
that Peru refused to compensate the company for its losses. The dispute dominated 
U.S.-Peruvian relations over the next five years.
Background
Shortly after toppling the civilian government of President Fernando Belaunde 
Terry (1963-1968) in October 1968, the military junta o f General Juan Velasco 
Alvarado (1968-1975) targeted IPC ’s holdings in Peru, claiming that IPC had "unjustly 
enriched" itself over nearly a quarter century at the expense o f the Peruvian people.
The junta seized IPC's La Brea y Parinas oilfields and Talara industrial complex 
immediately, and a few months later took its remaining assets. The military 
government calculated IPC's indebtedness from 1924 through 1968 at $690.5 million 
for crude oil extracted under an invalid title and tax arrangement, and demanded that 
the company pay this sum before Peru would consider compensation for seized assets.1
President Velasco seized IPC 's assets to settle a controversy that had plagued 
previous Peruvian governments. The dispute stemmed from IPC's claim to subsoil
lBruce A. Blornstrom and W. Bowman Cutler, "The Foreign Private Sector in 
Peru." in U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru, ed. Daniel A. Sharp (Austin: Institute o f Latin 
American Studies. 1972), 260.
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rights for the La Brea y Parinas oilfields. The subsoil title to La Brea y Parinas, which 
originally served as a pitch mine, was sold by the state to a Peruvian national in 1826 
as part o f the state's program to finance enormous debts incurred in fighting for its 
1821 independence from Spain. The government approved the title transfer despite a 
provision in Peru's 1823 Constitution upholding the colonial-era principle that private 
citizens could only extract subsoil resources under concession status. La Brea y Parinas 
was later purchased by British investors in 1888, and extensive petroleum production 
began soon thereafter. This arrangement still stood when IPC, then a subsidiary of 
Canada's Imperial Oil Company, purchased the La Brea y Parinas properties from its 
British owners in 1924. The Imperial Oil Company was later acquired by the Standard 
Oil Company o f New Jersey.2 Since the claim to subsoil ownership was never 
overruled, IPC maintained the unique status (which could not be claimed by any other 
private parties) of holding a  title to Peru’s subsoil resources.
By the mid-1950s, increased public criticism prompted company officials to 
resolve the situation. They proposed in 1957 that President Manuel Prado Ugarteche 
exchange the subsidiary's claim o f subsoil ownership to La Brea y Parinas for 
concession status. As part o f the exchange, IPC requested several commercial benefits 
to enhance its business activities in Peru. The government, however, rejected the
2John E. Huerta, "Peruvian Nationalizations and the Peruvian-American 
Compensation Agreements," New York University Journal o f International Law and 
Politics 10, no. 1 (Spring 1977): 10-11; Peru, "Origin of the 'L a  Brea y Parinas 
P roperty,'” La Brea v Parinas Controversy. (Lima: Government o f Peru, no date 
given), vol. 1: exhibits 1, 14; and Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Peruvian Democracy Under 
Economic Stress: An Account o f the Belaunde Administration. 1963-1968. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), 110-17.
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proposal, stating it should not have to confer further privileges for property that was 
rightfully Peruvian.3 The government's reaction reflected domestic opinion that the 
IPC had long operated illegally in Peru.
The election o f Fernando Belaunde Terry as President in 1963 heralded new 
troubles for IPC. His pledge of extensive agrarian reform, infrastructural 
development, an improved education system, and a  solution to the IPC case within 
ninety days o f assuming office had wide appeal among voters.4 Although he made 
gains on most o f  these issues, President Belaunde fell far short on his promises.
Belaunde's failure to resolve the IPC controversy marred his presidency.
Instead o f reaching a solution within 90 days, negotiations continued sporadically for 
two years, before reaching an eventual stalemate in 1966. The State Department, in 
turn, showed displeasure with Belaunde's threats toward foreign-owned property by 
withholding development loans needed for public works projects. Moreover, currency 
devaluation and a rash o f strikes hampered domestic production and economic growth 
by 1966, and Belaunde's agrarian reform measures encountered staunch opposition 
from the legislature and wealthy landowners. His position deteriorated further when 
the United States withdrew military assistance in 1966 over his decision to purchase 
French Mirage fighter aircraft after the United States had refused to sell U.S. planes to
3Jessica Pernitz Einhorn. Expropriation Politics. (Lexington: Lexington Books. 
1974), 13; Kucyznksi, 117.
4For further information on Belaunde's reform measures, see, Kuczynski. 48-
70.
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Peru.5 This combination o f factors sparked strong criticism from Peru's military 
toward the civilian government and, ultimately, contributed to its downfall.
Realizing that domestic and external pressures were taking a  toll on the nation, 
Belaunde executed a  last-ditch effort to resolve the IPC controversy in m id-1968. He 
had several reasons for urgency. First, on 20 June, the Peruvian Congress had granted 
him a 60-day period during which he could enact emergency economic measures, 
exempt from legislative review, to resolve the domestic financial crisis. Second, he 
understood that full U.S. economic assistance would not resume until he settled the IPC 
issue.6 While both the public and press had grown extremely critical o f IPC by this 
stage, Belaunde apparently believed that the long-term benefits o f resolving the 
controversy (which would undoubtedly require concessions by Peru) outweighed any 
short-term criticism he might encounter.
After several weeks o f intense negotiations, Belaunde presented the nation with 
the Act o f Talara, a series o f agreements to settle permanently the La Brea y Parinas 
controversy. The principal document declared that the La Brea y Parinas oilfields 
henceforth belonged to the state (to be operated by the state-owned Empresa Petrolera 
Fiscal), canceled all debts claimed to have been owed Peru by the IPC, legitimized 
IPC's other operations in Peru, and granted the company permission to expand the
5Jorge Avendano Valdes and Domingo Garcia Belaunde, "Peru,'' in 
Expropriation in the Americas: A Comparative Law Study, ed. Andreas F. Lowenfeld 
(New York, Dunellen, 1971) 190; and Charles T . Goodsell, "Diplomatic Protection of 
U.S. Business in Peru," in U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru, ed. Daniel A. Sharp (Austin: 
University o f Texas Press, 1972), 248-49.
6Kuczynski. 260-63.
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Talara refinery. A second document detailed the future price for IPC's purchase of 
natural gas from Empresa Petrolera Fiscal (EPF), while a  third explained the rates at 
which it would purchase crude oil.7 To Belaunde's surprise, this did not end the 
controversy.
Rather than settle the issue, the Act o f  Talara stirred up more trouble. Carlos 
Loret de Mola, who had directly participated in the IPC negotiations as head o f EPF, 
declared on 10 September that the final page o f the IPC crude oil purchasing 
agreement was missing from the official text. According to Loret de Mola, the final 
page contained the calculations for the purchase o f crude oil. While the existence of 
this missing page was never determined, the calculations it allegedly contained were 
already part o f the agreement itself. Nevertheless, Loret de Mola's accusations alerted 
observers who had not carefully read the agreement to the fact that IPC had been given 
very favorable rates, and many came to believe that Belaunde had rushed to resolve the 
IPC issue during the two-month congressional grant o f extraordinary powers to 
circumvent congressional review.8 No am ount o f explaining would satisfy those who 
had long opposed the continued existence o f  IPC, including military leaders.
On 3 October 1968, nearly one month after the "missing page" controversy 
began, the Peruvian military toppled the Belaunde government. This military junta was
7American Society of International Law. "Documents and Legislation 
Concerning Expropriation o f La Brea and Parinas Oilfields in Peru, 1922-1968," 
International Legal Materials 7. no. 6 (November 1968): 1217-54.
8For an explanation of the calculations, see. "No se Encuentra Original del 
Contrato Celebrado Entre EPF-IPC Peru la Copia Tiene Valor Legal Sostienen 
Ministros," El Comercio (Santiago) 15 September 1968, 4: and Kuczynski, 260-263. 
266-272.
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unlike any past Peruvian military government. Its progressive, nationalistic, and 
reform-minded leaders sought to reduce foreign economic dependence, distribute 
national wealth more equitably, and dismantle the government institutions which it 
believed were responsible for the nation's current economic crisis. As part o f that plan 
they immediately took on the IPC issue. Junta leader General Juan Velasco Alvarado 
voided the Act o f Talara, nationalized IPC ’s La Brea y Parinas oilfields and Talara 
refinery, and later nationalized its remaining assets while simultaneously charging the 
subsidiary $690.5 million for profits accrued through unjust enrichment, plus nearly 
$15 million for profits received from petroleum production between October and 
December 1968.9
IPC immediately worked through Peru's legal system to have the debt claims 
overturned and to obtain compensation for the seized property. Company executives 
met with Peruvian officials through early spring 1969, but were unable to sway them 
on the debt issue. Meanwhile, the Peruvian government conducted its own valuation of 
the La Brea y Parinas properties and determined they were worth $71 million, an 
amount to be deducted from Peru’s $690.5 million claim .10 The IPC claimed that this
’While the IPC dispute certainly was a chief cause for the overthrow, the 
military also had other motivations. Primarily, it had lost confidence in the ability of 
Belaunde, and civilian governments in general, to implement needed economic and 
political reforms. Furthermore, the traditionally anti-military American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) party seemed likely to take power in national elections 
slated for June 1969. Therefore, October 1968 seemed a wise time for military 
intervention. Ingram, 61; James D. Rudolph, Peru: Evolution of a Crisis. (Westport: 
Praeger Publishers, 1992), 53-64; and Peru, La Brea y Parinas Controversy, vol. II: 
exhibits 60 and 62.
loCongress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Relations 
with Peru. 91st Cong.. 1st sess., 14, 16 and 17 April 1969, p. 104; and George
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proposal hardly constituted compensation and submitted its own valuation figures, as 
shown in Table 3. The central issue that concerned IPC was whether Peru would stand 
firm on the unjust enrichment issue.
From the start Velasco tried to isolate the IPC from other seizures. Between 
1968 and 1974, Peru nationalized dozens o f enterprises in the agricultural, banking, 
mining, and public utility sectors, many o f which were U .S.-owned. While most U.S. 
investors were compensated by the Peruvian government, several had difficulty 
agreeing upon a compensation figure. Meanwhile, Velasco repeatedly assured the 
international community that the uncompensated IPC seizure was a justifiable, isolated 
action. He added that Peru welcomed continued foreign investment, if subordinated to 
domestic economic considerations. In fact, even after deducting the generous sums 
awarded as compensation to expropriated foreign-owned enterprises, Peru still netted 
over $400 million in new foreign direct investment between 1968 and 1975." 
Nevertheless, the IPC seizure came to dominate U .S.-Peruvian relations in the Nixon 
administration.
Jackson Eder, "Hickenlooper and Hereafter," The International Lawyer 4. no. 4 (July 
1970): 619.
"T he Peruvian government’s strategy over the next six years was to direct 
foreign investment away from vital sectors, such as agriculture, banking, and public 
utilities, and into lagging sectors, such as manufacturing. Belco, Marcona Mining, the 
Southern Peru Copper Corporation, Occidental Petroleum, and other influential U.S. 
companies felt comfortable with arrangements under Velasco and continued to invest 
capital in new projects in Peru. Huerta, 33-34: Rudolf, 56: Ingram, 81; and Edmund 
Valpy Knox FitzGerald, The Political Economy o f Peru. 1956-78: Economic 
Development and the Restructuring o f Capital. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 45.




La Brea y Parinas producing a s se ts ..........................................................................  $80
Talara refinery/industrial c o m p le x ..........................................................................  $40
Subtotal..................................................................................................... $120
Lima concessions producing assets (estimated v a lu e ) ...........................................  $50
Marketing and distribution system (estimated v a lu e ) .......................................... $20
Grand total ............................................................................................. $190
Table 3 Standard O il's Valuation o f Properties Seized by Peru. Source: Congress, 
Senate, United States Relations with Peru. 111.
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The State Department Response
The State Department used bilateral assistance to pressure Peru on the IPC 
dispute throughout Belaunde’s term. President Lyndon Johnson's Assistant Secretary 
o f State for Latin America, Thomas C. Mann, opted to curtail bilateral assistance to 
Peru in 1964. By late 1965, the State Department realized that its policies had failed to 
resolve the controversy or further the goals o f the Alliance for Progress. When 
Lincoln Gordon replaced Mann as Assistant Secretary in early 1966, he reversed U.S. 
policy. The State Department halted bilateral aid again in 1967 over the Mirage 
dispute.12 In all, vacillating U.S. bilateral assistance failed to expedite a solution.
The State Department had an even greater mix o f opinions about Peru's new 
military government. While the Department sympathized with the junta 's objectives of 
building a self-sufficient, progressive economy, it opposed the means by which the 
military had seized control, and its assault on foreign-owned property. The 
Department expressed displeasure by withholding diplomatic recognition for nearly one 
month, and after resuming official ties. Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver instructed 
U.S. Ambassador John W. Jones to call upon Peru's Foreign Minister to acknowledge 
Peru's right to expropriate IPC property, so long as it provided the company just 
compensation.13 Aside from these activities, the State Department left the burden o f 
the IPC dispute to the incoming Nixon administration.
I2Einhorn. 19; and Ingram, 50-52.
13Department of State, "U.S. Policy Toward Governments o f Peru, 1822 - 
Present: Questions of Recognition and Diplomatic Relations." State Department 
Bulletin 71. no. 1947 (18 November 1974): 698: and Einhorn. 36.
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Punitive measures designed by the U.S. Congress to deter uncompensated 
seizures made the IPC controversy President Nixon's first regional problem when he 
assumed office in January 1969. These measures were the 1962 Hickenlooper 
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act o f 1961 and the Hoeven Amendment to the 
Sugar Act o f 1948. The Hickenlooper Amendment was created in the aftermath o f 
nationalizations in Cuba, Brazil, and Ceylon, and required the President to suspend 
assistance to any nation that nationalized or expropriated U .S. property without 
reasonable steps toward providing just compensation within six months. The 1962 
Hoeven Amendment was also motivated by property seizures o f the early 1960s and 
required that the President suspend the sugar quota for nations that failed to compensate 
for seized U.S. properties, while simultaneously authorizing the President to levy a  tax 
on subsequent sugar imports to recompense U.S. claimants. Alteration o f the sugar 
quota posed the greatest threat to Peru, since its sugar sales to the United States in 1968 
constituted seven percent o f its total exports. Removal o f the quota would cost Peru at 
least $45 million in the first year alone, while implementation o f the Hickenlooper 
Amendment would result in an additional $34 to S37 million loss.14 Together, these 
laws threatened to have an enormous impact on the Peruvian controversy.
The State Department policy-makers in charge o f the Peruvian dispute opposed 
the sanctions for numerous reasons. First, they believed that reducing or terminating 
Peru's sugar quota under the Hoeven Amendment would not just harm Peruvian
l4For the full text of the Hickenlooper Amendment see, Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1962. amended. U.S. Code. Title 22. sec. 2370(e)(1) (19701. For the Hoeven 
Amendment see. Sugar Act Amendments. Statutes at Large. 85, sec. 17, 408 (1971). 
Einhorn. 24-25.
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producers, but also U.S.-owned enterprises, which comprised approximately 25 percent 
o f Peru 's sugar producing industry. Second, more than 250 U .S. companies currently 
operated in Peru, with assets worth between $600 and $700 million. Their investments 
might also be affected if Peru chose to retaliate against U .S. sanctions. Third, the 
pressure o f formal sanctions could radicalize Peru 's new m ilitary government.15 
Fourth, Standard Oil had not lobbied either the Administration or the U.S. Congress 
for implementation o f sanctions. Fifth, the U.S. Congress had not demanded that 
sanctions be enforced against Peru (presumably due to the lack o f pressure from the 
private sector). Sixth, given the numerous international crises already confronting the 
United States in Southeast Asia, a  dispute with Latin American neighbors was to be 
avoided at all cost.
In addition, the State Department maintained a dislike for these 
Congressionally-mandated constraints on both the time period and form of response. 
Years earlier, under President Kennedy, Department officials had testified that such 
disputes could best be handled through a policy o f flexible response, while cautioning 
that hard-line policies could raise nationalist tendencies and actually hamper
I5The CIA 's Office of National Estimates concurred with the State Department’s 
assessment o f the potential impact o f formal sanctions. Congress, Senate, United 
States Relations with Peru. 127; Department o f Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business 50. no. 10 (October 1970): 28.; W .E. Kuhn, "The Hickenlooper Amendment 
as a Determinant o f the Outcome of Expropriation Disputes." The Social Science 
Journal 14, no. 1 (January 1977): 75; and Einhorn. 53.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
negotiations, as policy makers believed could now happen in Peru.16 Despite 
Department opposition to sanctions, the laws could not be ignored.
The Department hoped to postpone sanctions on the grounds that Peru was 
taking "appropriate steps" (as required in both the Hickenlooper and Hoeven 
amendments) toward resolving the controversy. To ensure that such steps were taken 
required official diplomatic involvement, since the IPC's appeal through Peru's legal 
channels had failed. The State Department decided to send a high-level U.S. 
representative to negotiate. U .S. Ambassador to Peru John W. Jones was not selected 
to lead the talks since he had acquired a reputation during his six years as Ambassador 
for being closely connected to IPC executives and former President Belaunde. Instead, 
the Department settled on John Irwin III, a Wall Street lawyer who had earlier served 
as Assistant Secretary o f Defense (1958-1960) and had helped negotiate a new Panama 
Canal Treaty (1965-1967). The White House made its official announcement on 11 
March, and the State Department gave him an open-ended agenda, using IPC's 
valuation o f  its assets as the basis for negotiations.17 The Administration, in truth, 
doubted initial negotiations would lead to a compromise, but the mission at least bought 
the White House time and provided a pretense for deferring sanctions..
I6Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Expropriation of American- 
owned Property by Foreign Governments in the Twentieth Century. 26-27; and Charles 
Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign -CapitaLin.the Nineteenth, and Twentieth 
Centuries. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 210-13.
17President, Statement, "Special Emissary to Peru," Weekly Compilation o f 
Presidential Documents 5. no. 11 (17 March 1969): 395; Huerta. 13-14: and Einhorn. 
42, 44-45.
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The initial talks were merely exploratory. Irwin conducted nearly three weeks 
o f negotiations in Peru with government officials, including President Velasco. Talks 
ended in early April 1969 with little progress, but Irwin announced that he would 
resume negotiations after consulting with U .S. officials. In the final week before the 9 
April deadline for sanctions, Irwin briefed both top State Department policy-makers 
and President Nixon on the IPC dispute. After careful review, Secretary o f  State 
William Rogers announced on 7 April that the United States would postpone sanctions 
at least until August, citing continued talks between Irwin and Peruvian officials and 
Peru's promise to conduct an "administrative review" o f the IPC dispute, scheduled for 
completion on 6 August 1969.18 Both actions, from the State Department's view, 
constituted appropriate steps toward resolution, thereby making punitive action 
unnecessary.
Although the State Department had managed to justify temporary deferral of 
official sanctions, it realized that the move provided only a  temporary respite. The 
U.S. Congress supported the Department's efforts to negotiate and its policy o f flexible 
response, but reserved the power to reverse its position if  the climate for U .S. investors 
deteriorated or the Department failed to make progress. To alleviate these concerns, 
the Administration coupled the negotiations with the silent curtailment o f bilateral and 
multilateral economic assistance to Peru, following unofficially the dictates o f the 
Hickenlooper Amendment.
I8Einhorn, 48: and Congress, Senate. United States Relations with Peru. 119.
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The State Department had several means for applying bilateral economic 
pressure to Peru. They included cutting future Agency for International Development 
(AID) and other foreign assistance programs. Also, an unrelated dispute over Peru's 
firing upon and seizure o f U.S. fishing vessels, within Peru 's recognized 200 mile 
territorial waters, had already caused the State Department to suspend military sales in 
February 1969.19 The trend in bilateral assistance during this period is illustrated in 
Figure 3.
More so than in previous disputes, the Treasury Department played an active 
role in pressuring Peru economically. Treasury officials represented the United States 
before the multilateral lending institutions, and from its vantage point, voted against 
multilateral assistance on the grounds that Peru had proven itself uncreditworthy. 
Treasury began its policy under President Johnson in late 1968, shortly after the 
military coup, and maintained this course under President Nixon's Treasury Secretary 
David Kennedy.20 The Treasury Department needed no cue or formal legislation to 
pursue these policies, and it did so strictly on the basis o f  protecting U.S. economic 
interests, with little regard for the long-term impact on diplomatic relations between the 
two countries. Treasury's greater willingness to take a hard-line approach in defense of 
U.S. economic interests would later become a primary factor in the U.S. Congress'
19The decision to suspend military assistance through the Pelley Amendment was 
not made public until May 1969 so as not to endanger the Irwin negotiations. Einhorn. 
39.
20Ibid., 37-38.
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decision to formalize the use o f multilateral sanctions at the height o f the Chilean 
controversy, as described in the next section o f this chapter.
The State Department stopped short o f  applying further economic pressure on 
Peru. With curtailment o f  bilateral and multilateral assistance under way, the 
Department decided not to alter Peru 's sugar quota. Apparently, it wanted the Velasco 
government to feel pressured by the aid withdrawal, but not to the breaking point. By 
combining the Irwin mission with this less confrontational economic approach, the 
State Department managed to appease Congressional and private-sector hard-liners who 
would otherwise push for formal sanctions.21 This strategy saved the Department from 
confrontation that inevitably would have resulted from the formal announcement o f 
sanctions.
The Department's approach proved successful at averting demands for further 
action. When the August deadline arrived, the White House once again deferred 
sanctions, this time indefinitely, citing continued talks between Irwin and Peruvian 
officials. On 25 August 1969 Irwin returned to Peru for two weeks o f discussions, but 
once again failed to reach an understanding. At the same time, there is no indication 
that Standard Oil pushed for sanctions against Peru during this period. Perhaps 
Standard Oil was satisfied with the silent curtailment o f funds, or maybe it believed its 
best hope for receiving compensation rested with the State Department’s efforts. 
Likewise, nearly a year had passed since the La Brea y Parinas seizures, as had two 
deadlines for implementing mandatory sanctions, and Congressional attention toward
2lMartha L. Cottam. Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America. 
(Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press. 1994). 66-67.
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the dispute had also subsided.22 For the next four years, as Peru expropriated other 
U .S.-ow ned properties, and stalled in the IPC negotiations, the United States continued 
its policy o f  silent economic pressure.
The U .S. policy began to shift in 1973, primarily at the urging o f U .S. 
Ambassador Taylor Belcher. Ambassador Belcher, a career Foreign Service Officer, 
had pushed for a more lenient U.S. policy since his arrival in 1969. He gained the 
Departm ent’s full support after Secretary William P. Rogers visited Peru in May 1973. 
The military leadership's development-oriented objectives impressed Secretary Rogers 
and he requested that the Department renew talks with the Peruvian government on all 
outstanding claims. Moreover, massive nationalizations in Chile under the Marxist 
government o f Salvador Allende overshadowed the Peruvian dispute, and Secretary 
Rogers hoped to make clear to Allende the contrast between the Chilean dispute and the 
relatively smaller dispute with Peru.23 To encourage a settlement, the opening o f talks 
was coupled with new aid packages.
The Velasco government readily accepted the U.S. offer to resume negotiations, 
but a significant problem remained. Peru insisted that IPC 's claims be excluded from 
discussion, since the issue had, in its view, been resolved. Thus, the State Department 
understood that it would have to develop a  creatively-worded settlement that would 
somehow incorporate IPC, yet allow the Peruvian government to deny that the 
company had been compensated. This responsibility was left to a new special
22Ibid, 57: and Lipson, 302.
^Congress, House, John Culver. "Renewal of Credits to Peru," Congressional 
Record 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (20 September 1973). vol. 119, pt. 24. 30759.
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emissary, James R. Greene, whose August 1973 appointment was followed a  few 
weeks later by U.S. support for a $12.3 million Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) loan, a  $25 million World Bank loan, and consideration o f a second $41 million 
IDB loan.24 The State Department hoped that these gestures would create a positive 
setting for negotiations and flexibility on the part o f Peru toward IPC.
Peru did indeed bend on the IPC issue. After six months and several rounds o f 
talks, both countries announced on 19 February 1974 that suitable compensation figures 
had been agreed upon for the companies that Peru recognized as having valid 
outstanding claims. An annex to the final agreement specified the affected companies, 
and IPC, o f  course, was not on the list. Meanwhile, the agreement called for Peru to 
deliver a lump sum payment o f $76 million to cover those claims, while leaving the 
actual distribution of those funds to the U.S. governm ent's discretion.25 Such wording 
enabled the State Department to acknowledge Peru's intended recipients o f 
compensation and at the same time use over $22 million from the settlement to 
compensate Standard Oil.
The State Department approach to the Peruvian settlement revealed that 
innovative approaches to resolve disputes touching sensitive issues of national pride and
24Department of State, "United States and Peru Hold Investment Discussions," 
State Department Bulletin 69, no. 1783 (27 August 1973): 310; Huerta, 37-38; and 
Congress, House, John Culver, "Renewal o f Credits to Peru," Congressional Record. 
30759.
“ Department of State, "U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement on Certain Investment 
Disputes," State Department Bulletin 70, no. 1812 (18 M arch 1974): 272-73: and 
Huerta, 36-39.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
sovereignly did work. In the overlapping Chilean dispute, however, a drastically 
different political environment led to a very different ending.
Chile
Despite the State Department's successful diplomatic settlement of the Peruvian 
controversy, a similar solution could not be found in Chile. President Nixon's 
expressed dislike o f Salvador Allende Gossens (1970-1973) led the White House to 
formulate confrontational economic and political policies toward Chile. These actions 
added to the international and internal pressures that ultimately led to Allende's 
downfall. Meanwhile, new actors, new policies, and new legislation emerged from the 
Chilean experience, which affected the way in which the State Department handled 
property seizure disputes.
Background
For the six years preceding Allende’s 1970 victory, Chile was governed by 
Eduardo Frei Montalva. leader o f the centrist Christian Democrat party. Frei was 
highly regarded by Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon for his liberal trade 
and investment policies, coupled with a moderate program o f social and economic 
development. They responded to Frei's approach by forwarding greater per capita 
Alliance for Progress assistance to Chile than to any other nation in the hemisphere 
during this period.26
Allende's program differed from Frei's in degree. Frei had begun popular 
programs of agrarian reform and wealth redistribution, and had initiated a
26Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years o f Salvador Allende. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985). 3.
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"Chileanization" program to capture greater domestic control over C hile 's vital copper 
industry. Allende's Popular Unity party (a coalition o f Chile's Communist, Socialist 
and other left-wing parties), however, called for radical redistribution o f  land and 
wealth. He initiated agrarian reform and complete government control o f vital 
industries.27 While Frei had laid the groundwork for these reforms, his programs paled 
in comparison to the size and pace promised by Allende.
Both wealthy nationals and foreign investors feared the proposed nationalization 
program. Allende's plan singled-out the foreign-dominated copper industry, the 
nation’s financial institutions, large landholdings, public utilities, and numerous 
manufacturing enterprises as early targets for seizure.28 Several of these industries 
were domestically controlled, such as large landholdings and the textile industry, but it 
was clear from the beginning that foreign-owned (predominantly U.S.-owned) 
investments would also be greatly affected by the new government's plans.
Given the large number o f  seizures enacted by the Allende government, they 
must be described in broader terms. The seizures generally took one o f  three forms: 
administrative takeover, purchasing arrangement (often under duress), or 
nationalization. U.S.-owned property was first seized in mid-November, less than 
three weeks after Allende's inauguration, when the Chilean government took over 
subsidiaries controlled by the Northern Indiana Brass Company and Ralston Purina.
27Ibid., 5. Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 50.
28Paul E. Sigmund. The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics o f Chile. 1964- 
1976. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1977), 88-90.
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Then, in January 1971, Allende began to nationalize the banking industry (of which 
two firms were U.S.-owned), reaching eventual settlement with the affected companies, 
followed by negotiated buyouts and takeovers o f  at least two-dozen other U.S.-owned 
firms, including Bethlehem Steel's iron producing facilities and the Chilean subsidiaries 
o f RCA-Chile and Armco Steel.29 In July 1971 came the largest seizures, those o f  the 
U.S.-owned copper subsidiaries, followed by the administrative takeover of 
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) subsidiaries in September 1971. 
Meanwhile, thousands o f estates (most o f which were Chilean-owned) and dozens o f 
manufacturing enterprises were seized throughout A llende's term in office. However, 
due to the monetary amount involved and actions taken by the affected companies, the 
copper and ITT disputes warranted greatest attention from the State Department.
As stated, Frei had started the process o f  nationalizing the copper industry four 
years earlier through his "Chileanization" program , which drew upon decades of 
domestic discontent over foreign dominance in C hile's chief export and foreign 
exchange earner. Allende himself accurately summarized domestic sentiment when he 
estimated that the foreign firms had made a t least a $10 billion profit from sixty years 
o f mining Chilean copper, while Chile's total accumulated national wealth over the 
previous four centuries had amounted to no more than $9.5 billion. In 1965, Frei 
raised the state’s share o f ownership in the Anaconda Group, Kennecott Copper 
Corporation, and Cerro de Pasco Corporation (the three largest U.S.-owned copper
29Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States and Chile 
During the Allende Years. 1970-1973: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Affairs. (Washington, D.C.: GPO 1975), 116-117.
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companies) by gradually increasing Chilean participation, and compensating the copper 
companies out o f  profits accrued through increased production.30 The arrangement was 
designed to appease the copper companies and at the same time enable Chile to 
continue receiving much needed foreign assistance.
A llende's approach, by contrast, risked confrontation by discarding the Frei 
method and moving quickly to nationalize the entire industry. The Chilean Congress 
approved an amended version o f Allende's nationalization proposal in July 1971. The 
final bill provided for compensation based on the company's declared book value as of 
31 December 1970, minus amortization, depreciation, and total "excess profits" 
extracted by the companies, to be paid over 30 years at not less than 3 percent annual 
interest. The Comptroller General determined compensation, factoring in the excess 
profits calculations that Allende would himself provide. Three months after passage of 
the copper nationalization bill, the Comptroller General announced his valuation figures 
and A llende's excess profits determination. After combining excess profits with other 
book value deductions, the Comptroller General charged that only Cerro de Pasco
^Louis Wiznitzer, "An Interview with Chile's Allende," Christian Science 
M onitor. 11 February 1972, 7. John Fleming, "The Nationalization of Chile's Large 
Copper Companies in Contemporary Interstate Relations," Villanova I^w  Review 18. 
no. 4 (March 1973): 594-95.
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Corporation merited compensation.31 For Anaconda and Kennecott, calculated excess 
profits greatly exceeded valid claims (see Table 4).
Anaconda and Kennecott immediately protested the seizures in Chile and 
abroad. They demanded that President Allende make public his calculations for 
determining the excess profits figure, which he never did. Next, they engaged in a 
long process o f appealing Allende's ruling, and appeared before the Chilean Special 
Copper Tribunal in December 1971. After months o f deliberation, the Tribunal 
declared that it did not have the power o f judicial review over the excess profits 
determination, and later rejected Kennecott's request for a rehearing in September
1972. In the meantime, Kennecott and Anaconda exerted international pressure, by 
mounting an effective campaign to boycott Chilean copper, and by initiating suits in the 
United States and Europe to attach Chile's foreign assets.32 Simultaneously, their 
Washington offices lobbied the U.S. government to take a hard-line toward Chile.
3lFor the full-text o f  the copper industry nationalization bill, see American 
Society o f International Law, "Chile: Constitutional Amendment Concerning Natural 
Resources and their Nationalization," International Legal Materials 10, no. 5 
(September 1971): 1067-72; Ingram, 273-75; and Falcoff, 181. For details on the 
Comptroller General's final ruling on compensation see, American Society of 
International Law, "Comptroller General's Resolution on the Determination of 
Compensation," International Legal Materials 10, no. 6 (November 1971): 1240-53.
32Ingram, 283, 288; Davis, 101. The Special Copper Tribunal was comprised 
of a Justice of the Supreme Court (presiding member), a member o f the Appeals Court 
o f Santiago, a member o f the Constitutional Tribunal, the President of the Central Bank 
o f Chile, and the National Director o f Internal Revenue. The decision o f the Copper 
Tribunal was considered final. American Society o f International Law, "Chile: 
Constitutional Amendment Concerning Natural Resources and their Nationalization." 
International Legal Materials 1069.
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Anaconda 325.2 n/a 6.05 23.25 364 -68.1
Kennecott 318.8 198.6 0.2 20.5 410 -310.4
Cerro de 
Pasco 20.1 n/a 1.5 0.3 +  18.3
Table 4 Chilean Government Rulings on Compensation to American Mining Concerns 
Source, Falcoff, 182.
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The September 1971 ITT seizures created equally difficult problems for the 
State Department. ITT had possessed over $200 million in assets in Chile by 1971, 
including 70 percent ownership o f the Companla de Telefonos de Chile (Chiltelco), and 
full ownership o f a telephone directory company, a telecommunications equipment 
plant, and two hotels. The Allende government had negotiated with ITT for at least six 
months on nationalizing Chiltelco and the phone directory company. After losing 
patience with ITT 's delaying tactics, Allende took over both subsidiaries in September 
1971, but continued with negotiations on compensation. ITT rejected Chile’s 
subsequent offer o f $25 million for the seized properties and later proposal for an 
impartial assessment, arguing publicly that Chiltelco alone was worth at least $153 
million, while apparently reasoning privately that it would be satisfied with the $92 
million due in insurance from the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC). ITT's strategy backfired, however, upon disclosure in March 1972 that 
company executives had channeled covert financial assistance to opposition parties 
during the 1970 elections in an effort to thwart an Allende victory. Allende had long 
suspected that ITT had worked actively to block his election campaign, and with 
revelation o f these allegations, he withdrew his compensation offer. ITT suffered a 
further setback in April 1973 when its request for payment on its OPIC insurance 
policy was rejected on the basis that the company had failed to comply with the non­
provocation clause in its insurance contract, thereby harming the U.S. position as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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successor to the claim.33 Even before Allende enacted his program, however, ITT had 
begun to lobby the Executive and Legislative branches for action against Chile.
As the nationalization program proceeded, economic and political difficulties 
mounted for Allende. Rampant inflation, over $3 billion in loan obligations, capital 
flight, and the drop in global copper prices took a toll in 1972. At the same time, his 
political coalition, which had been weak from the very beginning, now began to slip 
even further. Allende’s Popular Unity party had come into power with a  mere 36.6 
percent o f the popular vote, compared to 35 percent for the National Party candidate 
and 27.8 percent for the Christian Democrat party. By 1972, however, Allende would 
also have to contend with independent political actions taken by the most radical leftists 
(who had different views as to the pace and direction the reforms should take) and a 
series o f damaging strikes.34 The crises fragmented his coalition and destabilized his 
government.
Surprisingly, despite Allende’s Marxist-oriented platform, other communist 
countries failed to come to his rescue, as they had for Castro one decade earlier.
Within six months of his inauguration, Allende had reestablished diplomatic and 
economic ties with Cuba, most o f the Soviet bloc, and the People's Republic of China.
33Davis, 69-71; Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson revealed in March 1972 
that ITT had supported opposition parties against Allende in the 1970 elections. Jack 
Anderson, "Memos Bare ITT Try for Chile Coup,” Washington Post. 21 March 1972. 
B18.
^Congress, House, United States and Chile During the Allende Years. 1970- 
1973 . 68-69, 74-75; Edward Boorstein, An Inside View: Allende's Chile. (New York: 
International Publishers, 1977), 187-204; Valenzuela. 61; and Davis, 5, 85-93. 196- 
203.
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During his first two years in office, total aid from the U .S .S .R . ranged between $500- 
600 million, while other Warsaw Pact countries contributed approximately $250 
million. Even though bilateral aid from the Soviet bloc massively overshadowed the 
$34 million in bilateral assistance forwarded to Chile by the United States during the 
same period (over one-half of which was military assistance), it did not alleviate the 
nation's massive economic problem s.35 Apparently, the U .S.S .R . concluded that Cuba 
was enough o f an economic burden, Chile's plight was a  low strategic priority, 
domestic concerns outweighed its desire to ensure Allende’s success, and emerging 
East-West detente made full-fledged support for Chile untenable.
Insurmountable international and domestic difficulties prompted the traditionally 
conservative and non-interventionist Chilean military to cut short Allende's Marxist 
experiment in September 1973. In the aftermath o f the 11 September coup, junta 
leader General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte quickly reversed Allende's three years of 
initiatives by divesting the government o f its recently acquired assets, compensating 
aggrieved former owners, encouraging the return o f Western capital, and re-building 
cordial ties with the United States.36 As will be described below, the U.S. contribution 
to the climate that brought about this change more closely resembled actions previously 
undertaken toward Guatemala two decades earlier than the parallel dispute with Peru.
35U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 
Series o f Yearly Data: Volume II. Latin America and Caribbean. Chile tables.
36Davis, 26.
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The State Department Response
Even though diplomacy failed to resolve the Chilean dispute, the exercise 
proved a learning experience for the State Department. The Department would have to 
contend with a confrontational White House agenda toward Chile, pressure from the 
private sector and Congress for a hard-line approach, and the involvement o f  new U.S. 
government actors in shaping foreign policy.
The Nixon White House set the U.S. position toward Chile’s Allende. Its 
approach was confrontational, largely due to the President's belief that Chile 
represented a greater threat to U.S. investment and regional security than Peru.
Allende had demonstrated that it was possible for a  Marxist to be elected through 
peaceful democratic channels, and he made clear his intention to nationalize large 
portions o f the Chilean economy at any cost, bringing him into direct conflict with 
U.S. investors.37 The Nixon White House feared Chile’s M arxist experiment, if 
successful, might be emulated elsewhere.
The White House had good reason to believe that tough, yet non-overt pressure 
could produce results. First, the Allende coalition was very weak, making many o f its 
drastic reforms all the more difficult to implement. Second, U .S. military attaches 
operating in Chile enjoyed a long and close relationship with the traditionally 
conservative Chilean armed forces, which Allende had neither the strength to control 
nor dismantle.38 This relationship enabled U.S. intelligence to monitor the Chilean
37Henry Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1979), 657, 671.
38Davis, 26.
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opposition movement, which in turn allowed the W hite House to formulate U.S. policy 
toward Chile without relying on U.S. diplomats, or even consulting with Department 
officials on covert activities.
The strategy o f confrontation consisted o f covert funding to opposition groups 
and economic pressure. Covert assistance was not a  new policy in U .S.-Chilean 
affairs. During the 1964 elections, the CIA had channeled funds to Allende's 
opponents, and it did so again during the 1970 elections, under a program that became 
known as Track I. Once Allende assumed power, the funding continued under a course 
now termed Track II. White House officials later explained that covert assistance had 
continued after Allende's inauguration to ensure survival o f opposition parties until the 
1976 Chilean presidential elections. Critics, however, have alleged that covert 
assistance sponsored more damaging opposition activities (such as strikes and 
propaganda campaigns) in order "destabilize" the Allende government. As for 
economic pressure, President Nixon took the advice o f National Security Advisor 
Henry Kissinger to pursue a "cool but correct" outward policy toward Allende. 
Kissinger issued a National Security Decision Memorandum six days after Allende's 
inauguration, outlining new policies for putting indirect economic pressure on Chile. 
The memorandum instructed the State Department and other U.S. government agencies 
with authority over bilateral and multilateral aid not to approve new funding for Chile, 
to deny investment guaranty requests, and to assess whether on-going funding programs 
could be either reduced or terminated.39 These policies resulted in a sharp decline in
39Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile. 1963-1973. 94th Cong., 1st
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funding to Chile during the Allende years (see Figure 4), and ultimately helped to 
destabilize the government. W hile unpublicized U.S. economic policies toward Chile 
set the tone for U.S.-Chilean economic relations, the Nixon administration still had to 
develop a policy with regard to Congressionally-mandated sanctions. In the Chilean 
dispute, only the Hickenlooper amendment applied, since Chile produced virtually no 
sugar.
As White House political and economic policies unfolded, several o f  the most 
influential U .S. firms with investments in Chile moved quickly after Allende's victory 
to pressure the Executive branch into taking strong action against Chile. An ad hoc 
group of Washington representatives of several U .S. firms with subsidiaries in Chile 
convened periodically to discuss the situation in Chile and responses they wanted from 
the U.S. government to protect their investments. During these meetings, ITT 
representatives (the committee's organizers) attempted to persuade other companies to 
pressure the Administration to take a  hard-line approach toward Chile. ITT predicted 
that the State Department would convince the White House to avoid implementing the 
Hickenlooper amendment and suggested that efforts should instead be focused on the 
National Security Council, the W hite House, and sympathetic members o f Congress.
sess., 1975, Committee Print, 6-13; Davis, 5-13, 21-22; Blaiser, 266; and Kissinger. 
679-81.
■•"Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Multinational 
Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations. 93rd Cong., 1st sess., March and April 1973. 629. 794- 
95.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
As ITT had predicted, the State Department had various reasons to oppose use 
o f the Hickenlooper amendment, for several reasons. First, as in the case of Peru, the 
Department feared that the remaining U.S. investments in Chile (valued at over $85 
million) would be seized in retaliation. Second, the Department had, for good reasons, 
dodged mandatory sanctions in Peru, and a dissimilar course o f action toward Chile 
would trigger allegations o f discrimination. Third, official sanctions would have a 
minimal impact on U.S. bilateral assistance and might actually galvanize Chilean 
support for Allende. Fourth, during the first two years of the Allende government, 
further avenues o f recourse remained open to U .S. firms, since those companies which 
had not received acceptable compensation were either still engaged in some form of 
negotiation or appealing such actions through Chilean legal channels. Finally, the 
Department feared Chile might retaliate by reneging on $940 in existing loan 
obligations to the Export-Import Bank and A ID.41 The Department believed official 
use o f sanctions would provoke a crisis, with no foreseeable benefits.
Despite the soft-line State Department position, the Treasury Department, as in 
Peru, took a strong stance against multilateral aid and debt negotiations with Chile. 
Negative votes by Treasury representatives before the World Bank and the IDB meant 
that virtually no loans were approved for Chile during the Allende years. Treasury 
once again argued that its decision was not political, but economic, because Chile was a 
bad credit risk. Later, in April 1972 Paris Club debt renegotiations, the Treasury 
Department pressured Chile on compensation by inserting a provision into the final
4,Davis. 73: and Ingram, 308-09.
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agreement promising that Chile would provide just compensation for seized properties, 
and Chile signed it.42 The Treasury Department's actions revealed once again its 
ability to influence U.S. policy toward property seizures independent o f the State 
Department.
Even though the State Department had justified rejection o f the Hickenlooper 
amendment, public and private pressure for formal action mounted. As the pace of 
Chilean seizures gained momentum in early 1971, and action against the copper 
industry appeared eminent, informal discussion began in mid-spring 1971 between the 
under secretaries and assistant secretaries of Commerce, State and Treasury as to the 
appropriate official response. The meetings expanded into a formal inter-agency 
review in July, at President Nixon's request. Over the following months, officials 
from all three departments, OPIC, the National Security Council, and the White House 
worked on clarifying the Administration's position toward property seizures, long-term 
strategies for safeguarding U.S. foreign investment and developing a  U.S. government 
response plan for future seizures.43
Six months later, on 19 January 1972, President Nixon publicly announced the 
Administration's policy on uncompensated seizures. It was the first time the Executive
42Davis, 76-77. The Paris Club is comprised o f the leading Western 
industrialized countries, and provides a procedure whereby debtor governments can 
negotiate with creditor governments to lighten debt obligations or acquire new 
financing. For more information, see, Alex Rieffel, The Role o f the Paris Club in 
Managing Debt Problems. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 2-10.
43Mark L. Chadwin, "Foreign Policy Report/Nixon's Expropriation Policy 
Seeks to Soothe Angry Congress," National Journal 4, no. 4 (22 January 1972): 148- 
153.
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branch ever delineated actions it would take to combat this problem. Nixon declared 
that the United States would reject new bilateral loans and oppose multilateral aid for 
seizures unaccompanied by compensation. To further pacify critics, Nixon announced 
that a  permanent inter-agency group would coordinate the U.S. response. Officially 
established in 1972, the State Department-chaired Inter-Agency Expropriation Group 
drew members from the Departments o f Commerce, Defense, and Treasury, as well as 
the National Security Council.44 The Expropriation Group reported directly to the 
White House Council on International Economic Policy. As mandated, the 
Expropriation Group would continuously review potential and on-going seizure 
disputes, determine in each instance whether a  seizure had occurred (and if so, whether 
efforts were being made to provide just compensation), recommend Administration 
action consistent with the President's January 19 policy statement, and coordinate the 
implementation o f U.S. policy. The Expropriation Group marked the first formal 
mechanism designed to improve inter-agency dialogue and decision-making.
Although Congressional advocates o f stronger Executive response to Chile were 
temporarily appeased, the drive for further binding legislation to address future disputes 
continued. Congressman Henry Gonzalez (D-TX) introduced legislation in late 1971 
requiring the Treasury Department to vote against multilateral assistance to countries 
that enacted uncompensated seizures o f U.S. property, in a manner similar to the
^Department of State, "President Nixon Issues Policy Statement on Economic 
Assistance," State Department Bulletin 66, no. 1702 (7 February 1972): 152-154. See 
also, General Accounting Office, Nationalizations and Expropriations o f U.S. Direct 
Private Foreign Investment: Problems and Issues. (Washington: GPO, 1977): 1-8.
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existing requirement under the Hickenlooper amendment for bilateral assistance.45 
Experience had shown that the Treasury Department was more likely to invoke such 
measures than the State Department, and would probably do so with or without State’s 
concurrence.
While the President, his advisors, other departments, and Congress struggled to 
control and define the Administration's policy toward uncompensated seizures. State 
Department and U .S. Embassy officials endeavored to maintain normal diplomatic 
relations with Chile and to push for a  solution to individual property seizure disputes. 
Edward M. Korry, who had worked as U.S. Ambassador to Chile since October 1967, 
continued at his post through the first year o f the Allende government, the period 
during which the bulk of the U.S. property seizures took place. Ambassador Korry’s 
efforts focused primarily on assisting U.S. firms targeted for seizure. For example, 
when Allende seized the Northern Indiana Brass Company's Chilean subsidiary in 
November 1970, the U.S. Embassy urged the Chilean government to offer 
compensation, and it made a similar effort on behalf o f Ralston Purina. In January 
1971, the Embassy moved to defuse potential conflict between the Chilean government 
and both Bethlehem Steel and Cerro de Pasco, by asking Chilean officials to negotiate 
buyouts.46 At this early stage, the Chilean government was engaged in buyout
45The provision became known as the Gonzalez Amendment. International 
Development Association Act. U .S. Code. Title 22, sec. 284j (1988). F o ra  
legislative history, see. United States-Code-CongressionaLand Administrative News.
(St. Paul: W est Publishing Co., 1972), 2:2017-2021.
‘“ Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities, Intelligence Activities. Senate Resolution 21:
Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
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negotiations with targeted U.S. investors, and left open avenues for recourse. As a 
result, the U .S. Embassy did not recommend State Department interposition on behalf 
o f U .S. companies, or ask for strong notes o f protest.
The U.S. Embassy's involvement intensified during the summer o f 1971 when 
the Chilean legislature took up consideration o f Allende's copper nationalization bill. 
After the announcement, Ambassador Korry met discreetly with opposition members o f 
the Chilean Congress in an effort to soften the blow to the U.S. copper companies. In 
the months between passage of the copper nationalization bill and the Comptroller 
General's compensation ruling in September 1971, Ambassador Korry presented 
suggestions for compensation, not only for the copper companies, but also for the ITT 
Chiltelco takeover. Korry proposed that Chile offer compensation to the copper 
companies over a period of twenty years and to ITT over twelve years, both in the 
form o f bonds at a "reasonable" interest rate. The seized U.S. companies would 
simultaneously request that OPIC provide a guarantee for the Chilean bonds. The 
Ambassador reasoned that the arrangement would benefit the U.S. companies by 
ensuring compensation for their investments and at the same time enable Chile to 
continue receiving foreign assistance.47 Despite Korry's efforts, the negotiations failed 
to reach a solution.
With a lull between crises, the Department deployed its new ambassador to 
Chile. Nathaniel Davis, who arrived in Santiago on 13 October 1971. His prior service
to Intelligence Activities. 94th Cong., 1st sess.. vol. 7. 4 and 5 December 1975, 129.
47Congress. Senate, Intelligence Activities. 128-133.
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as Acting Peace Corps Director to Chile in 1962, extensive service in Eastern Europe, 
and most recent service as Ambassador to Guatemala made him well suited for the job. 
A series o f new crises left Davis with a short adjustment period, however. Just before 
his arrival, the extremely costly ITT seizure had taken place, and Chile's Comptroller 
General had announced his final compensation determination for the U.S. copper 
companies. Secretary o f State Rogers responded publicly to this on 13 October, the 
day of Davis' arrival. Rogers noted that the U .S. companies had operated in full 
compliance with Chilean law. and he denounced the retroactively-applied excess profits 
determination as arbitrary and in violation on international law. He indicated that 
Chile's failure to adhere to internationally accepted standards for compensation could 
endanger future public and private investment.48 There was nothing more the Embassy 
itself could do overtly regarding the copper dispute until the Special Copper Tribunal 
issued its ruling.
Internally, the Department began to prepare for possible bilateral talks as a 
fallback measure. W hen the Tribunal issued its expected ruling against Kennecott and 
Anaconda in August 1972, the State Department formally proposed bilateral 
negotiations the following month. Through an exchange o f notes, the Chileans agreed, 
and four rounds o f talks were held between December 1972 and Allende's overthrow in 
September 1973. The closest the two sides came to making progress was during the 
second session, held in Washington in March 1973, when the Chilean delegation 
proposed that the copper dispute and other outstanding claims be subjected to
48Congress, House, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign 
Policy, 957.
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arbitration under a  1914 treaty o f  conciliation and arbitration. U.S. Ambassador 
Nathaniel Davis supported this option, but the U .S. delegation instead countered that 
the issue should be negotiated bilaterally, as Chile had pledged under Article 4 of the 
April 1972 Paris Club accord on debt renegotiation.49 Although the bilateral talks were 
merely exploratory, they at least bought the State Department time, thereby diverting 
the need for harsher overt measures.
Unlike previous disputes, OPIC played an active role in the Chilean 
controversy. The U.S. Congress had established OPIC in 1969 to assume 
responsibility for the government-sponsored investment guarantee program which had 
been handled by AID since 1949. AID had administered the direct insurance program 
as p an  of the Marshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Act, which included political risk 
insurance for U .S. investors in Europe after World War II. As Europe's need for 
assistance diminished during the 1950s, the political risk insurance program had turned 
its attention toward developing countries, and continued to do so under OPIC one 
decade later. Investors interested in development-oriented business ventures could 
apply for OPIC insurance against war risk, inconvertibility, and expropriation.50 Thus,
49Congress, House, United States and Chile During the Allende Years. 1970-
1973. 67. Chilean Ambassador to the U .S., Orlando Letelier, headed the first two 
talks for Chile, while Jose Toha, former Minister o f  Interior and Defense headed the 
final two delegations. On the U.S. side, Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer 
chaired the first U .S. delegation, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 
John Crimmins and Treasury Assistant Secretary John Hennessy jointly chaired the 
second delegation, and newly-appointed Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 
Jack Kubisch and Treasury Assistant Secretary Hennessy jointly chaired the final two 
talks. Davis, 103-04, 197.
“ Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation: A Critical Analysis, report prepared by Foreign Affairs
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in the event o f  an expropriation, insured investors could file a  claim on their investment 
policies, and, if awarded, OPIC would then inherit the com pany's former claim and 
proceed to negotiate with the expropriating government.
O PIC 's presence created both advantages and disadvantages for the State 
Department. Whereas OPIC had not guaranteed loans to companies investing in Peru, 
it inherited a  number of AID guarantees for investments in Chile issued during the 
more stable days o f the Frei administration. In fact, total OPIC exposure in Chile by 
1973 was only exceeded by commitments issued for Jam aica and Korea.51 
Expropriation insurance had been issued to at least a dozen companies operating in 
Chile, including ITT and the copper companies, and over $150 million in claims had 
been filed with OPIC for seized assets (see Table 5). To compound problems, AID 
had issued these guarantees without having first secured a  solid Bilateral Investment 
Treaty acknowledging the U.S. right to subrogate outstanding claims to the Agency for 
negotiation, which AID had usually (but not always) required before backing 
investment projects.52 Despite having over-extended itself in Chile, OPIC presented 
three advantages for the State Department. First, it served as a buffer between the
Division, Congressional Research Service, 93d C ong., 1st sess., 1973, Committee 
Print, 5-13, 17-21.
51Ibid., 54.
“ President Frei had negotiated a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United 
States, but reportedly decided not to present the treaty to the Chilean Congress for 
ratification because he feared it would be voted down. Congress, Senate. Multinational 
Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy. 392. For more information on subrogation 
rights see, Congress, House, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: A Critical 
Analysis. 100-103.




Bank o f A m e r ic a .................................................................................................... $3,010,272
Bethlehem S te e l ....................................................................................................... $3,076,820
Cerro Corp................................................................................................................$47,504,034
International Chem. Fibers, Inc............................................................................. $103,000
I T T ............................................................................................................................ $34,706,917
K enneco tt.................................................................................................................$66,900,000
Nibco, Inc...................................................................................................................  $110,000
Ralston Purina Company ...................................................................................... $826,475
Table 5: OPIC Claims Resolved by Cash Settlements and Guarantees. Source: OPIC 
30 September 1991 Press Release; Congress, House, United States and Chile During 
the Allende Years. 1970-1973 . 73.
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Department and the Chilean government, by providing yet another level o f recourse for 
U.S. investors. OPIC worked closely with several U.S. firms in Chile to keep 
negotiations going and to obtain just compensation for their seized properties. Second. 
OPIC expropriation insurance contracts called for a one-year "cooling-off period" after 
a seizure had taken place, during which the U.S. claimant was required to endeavor to 
negotiate for compensation.53 Third, several U.S. companies had received payment on 
their insurance policies, and others were in the process o f negotiating settlements with 
OPIC. Although payment by OPIC would still affect the Department in the long-term, 
since its investment guarantees ultimately were backed by the U.S. Treasury (which 
would therefore be burdened with the outstanding claim), O PIC 's presence at least 
alleviated part o f the expropriation problem in the short-term, by enabling the State 
Department to further justify a delay of sanctions.
State Department and OPIC efforts to press the Allende government for 
compensation yielded few results. Most o f the outstanding disputes would be settled 
unilaterally by Chile, under the Pinochet-led military junta that deposed Allende.
During Pinochet's first year in office, Chile successfully negotiated dozens o f 
agreements with affected U .S. companies, including the U .S. copper producers, for 
either compensation or the return of seized properties. Over 100 other state-owned 
enterprises went up for sale (which helped to finance many o f the compensation 
awards), open to bidding by both domestic and foreign investors. Anaconda and Cerro 
were awarded very favorable compensation, a portion o f which they received in cash
53Congress. House, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: A Critical 
Analysis. 96-100.
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and the bulk through long-term promissory notes.54 In all, the military junta succeeded 
in reversing Allende's actions as quickly as they had been enacted.
Conclusion
Although the two Nixon-era seizures overlapped chronologically, they evolved 
differently. The Belaunde and Frei were moderate and reform-minded, yet the State 
Department pressured Belaunde politically and economically throughout its term 
because it repeatedly threatened U.S. foreign investment. At the same time, the 
Department provided substantial economic and military assistance to the Frei 
government because o f its pro-Western stance and its gradual approach toward 
purchasing greater ownership of the nation’s copper industry. When the Velasco 
government seized control in Peru, the Department moved to a conciliatory approach 
because o f the junta’s ability to convey its pro-Western stance and its successful 
isolation o f the IPC seizure from other activities. In Chile, however, Allende's 
ideological and political orientation concerned the Nixon White House so much that it 
took direct control over U.S. decision making and established confrontational economic 
and political policies to combat this perceived threat to regional stability.
With the Administration's position toward each dispute fairly well established, 
the State Department nevertheless had to deal with the possible use o f official sanctions 
against property seizures for the first time in Latin America. The Department's 
decision not to use the Hickenlooper and Hoeven amendments against Peru restricted its 
range o f options toward Allende. Other Latin American nations would have
^Business International Corporation. Chile After Allende. (New York: Business 
International Corporation, 1975), 25-29.
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immediately accused the United States o f discriminatory policies against Allende had 
the Department succumbed to private sector and Congressional pressure for formal 
retaliatory measures against Chile.
The tim ing o f the State Department's involvement appeared appropriate in both 
disputes, but its level o f  effort toward Allende could have been greater. In Peru, the 
Department began negotiations early in the crisis to justify postponement of the 
Hickenlooper amendm ent, and it made use of appointed envoys to help break the 
stalemate. Early direct involvement in Chile, however, was deemed inappropriate 
since the Allende government had, a t least for the first two years, left open some 
further avenue o f  recourse to which U.S. investors could appeal. When the 
Department did attempt to negotiate bilaterally with Chile, it made little progress. The 
negotiators, State and Treasury Department Assistant Secretaries, could only devote a 
limited amount o f time given their wide areas of responsibility. Apparently, 
consideration was not given to appointing a special emissary whose effort would have 
been to reach a  settlement on outstanding claims. This approach, used successfully 
toward Peru, was never attempted in Chile.
The bureaucratic framework in which the Department operated had changed 
considerably by the close o f the Chilean dispute. On the positive side, the pressure of 
the Chilean seizures had forced the Executive branch to establish the Expropriation 
Group, to produce a unified response toward future seizures of U.S. properties abroad. 
Also, the presence o f OPIC added a new factor which furthered the Department's aim 
o f delaying the use o f  sanctions and reducing the need for diplomatic involvement. On
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the negative side, Congressionally imposed punitive measures further complicated both 
disputes and remained as an obstacle for future disputes.
The end result o f the Peruvian and Chilean disputes were ambiguous. Peru 
proved a good case study o f the State Department's handling o f property seizures.
There was one prominent property seizure in dispute, virtually no extra-regional threat, 
and a willingness by the Department to employ dedicated private sector negotiators in 
order to reach a  settlement. The extensive Chilean seizures, in contrast, were poorly 
handled by the Department, primarily because the W hite House set a confrontational 
tone early into the dispute, which restricted the Departm ent’s response options.
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SECTION in  
CONCLUSION




The six property seizure disputes discussed in this thesis span forty years and 
represent a  specific regional and institutional focus. This diversity o f case studies 
provides an ample framework for analyzing the evolution o f U.S. Department o f State 
responses to seizures over time, within the context o f  national and economic security 
concerns. Additionally, the cases provide guidance as to how the Department might 
avoid pitfalls in the future.
Several generalizations can be drawn from the case studies. First, conciliatory 
political approaches led to successful diplomatic outcomes, and confrontational policies 
led to failed diplomacy. Second, the State Department based its policy more on 
perceived economic and political security threats (i.e ., world war and communism) 
than property seizure disputes. Third, neither the type or size of the property seized, 
nor the influence of the seized company, had a noticeable impact on Department 
decision making. Fourth, while various forms of economic pressure were applied 
throughout every dispute, the tone o f the Department's political response had a greater 
effect than any economic measures taken. Fifth, when the State Department did 
become directly involved in negotiations, or in assisting claimants, its performance was 
consistent throughout every dispute.
The cases were evenly split between use of a conciliatory and confrontational 
approach. The State Department used a  conciliatory policy toward the small Bolivian 
petroleum confiscation, the large Mexican petroleum nationalization (over strong 
protests from prominent U.S. companies) and the large Peruvian petroleum
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confiscation. AH three cases were resolved through diplomatic channels with existing 
governments, and U.S. claimants were compensated for their losses. As a result, the 
Bolivian, Mexican and Peruvian disputes were diplomatic successes. In contrast, the 
Department ultimately adopted a confrontational approach toward the small Guatemalan 
agrarian expropriations and the enormous Cuban and Chilean nationalizations. 
Diplomatic communications turned antagonistic, and it became impossible to reach 
settlements with the existing governments. These three Cold War cases therefore were 
diplomatic failures.
The perceived level o f political and (or) economic threat posed by a given Latin 
American nation accounts for the political approach adopted by the State Department. 
The seizures themselves, meanwhile, were just one factor influencing U.S. policy. In 
Bolivia and Mexico, for example, the United States did not rush immediately to the aid 
o f U.S. oil interests, and adhered instead to President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor 
Policy, which advocated non-interference and non-intervention into the affairs o f Latin 
American nations. The United States became even more conciliatory toward both 
countries as involvement in World War II loomed on the horizon, and the need for 
hemispheric unity came to overshadow bilateral property disputes. The conciliatory 
approach taken toward Peru nearly a quarter century later was governed by Cold War 
concerns. The Department viewed Velasco as pro-foreign investment, and posing a 
low economic or political security threat. The Peruvian case also afforded the 
Department a chance to distinguish between “acceptable” policies and the 
“unacceptable” approach taken by Chile. The Cold War likewise colored the 
Department’s approach toward Guatemala and Cuba, where both countries were
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perceived as potential beachheads for communist expansion. In those cases, the 
Department took a hard-line.
Regardless o f whether U.S. policy makers believed they could co-exist with a 
particular government, they nevertheless pursued fairly similar economic retaliatory 
measures, with no consistent pattern o f success or failure. The State Department 
countered all six seizures by silently curtailing bilateral loan and grant assistance. In 
Mexico, Peru and Chile, the U.S. Treasury Department became involved. As 
requested by State Department hard-liners, the Treasury Department canceled Mexico’s 
silver purchasing arrangement. Later, in Peru and Chile, it voted against continued 
multilateral assistance. In Cuba, President Eisenhower suspended the nation’s sugar 
quota. While the silent curtailment o f bilateral and multilateral assistance appeared 
appropriate and justified, dabbling in commodity-specific retaliatory measures yielded 
undesirable results. The U.S. economy, for example, was as much harmed as the 
Mexican economy by the silver cancellation, and halting Cuba’s sugar quota merely 
expedited a break in bilateral diplomatic relations. Given the negative experience of 
these additional measures in Mexico and Cuba, the U.S. government should forego use 
of non-conventional sanctions unless it can be ascertained with certainty that the 
pressure created will be exclusively unilateral.
The dubious benefit o f economic pressure brings into question the strategy 
favored by hard-liners o f imposing mandatory economic sanctions, either as a tool or 
deterrence. After the Cuban nationalizations, Congressional hard-liners responded to 
public opinion by passing legislation requiring formal mandatory sanctions against 
uncompensated seizures, believing these measures would accomplish both objectives.
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while at the same time appeasing constituents who argued that the State Department 
would not fight to protect U.S. economic interests unless forced to do so. While not 
all State Department decision makers opposed this hard-line approach, the 
Department’s consensus was that mandatory formal sanctions were unnecessary, likely 
to cause further retaliation, and could potentially harm long-term bilateral and regional 
relations. Notwithstanding the unprovable argument o f deterrence, the Department 
appeared justified in its position. It curtailed new economic assistance in every dispute. 
The Department apparently realized that such high-profile nationalistic political seizures 
were irreversible for the existing government, and that formal sanctions would have 
been met with yet another formal and hostile response, thereby needlessly harming 
diplomatic relations with countries that might otherwise pose little threat to U.S. 
political and economic security.
The kind o f property seized, the dollar amount involved, and the political 
influence of the U.S. companies involved had little impact on State Department policy. 
The sectors varied from the oil industry in Bolivia, Mexico and Peru to the agricultural 
sector in Guatemala to widespread industrial enterprises and basic infrastructure in 
Cuba and Chile. All three oil seizures were political successes, while the agricultural 
and large industrial seizures were political failures. The dollar amounts ranged from 
small disputes in Bolivia and Guatemala to very large seizures in Mexico, Cuba, Peru 
and Chile. The Department succeeded politically in the small Bolivian and large 
Mexican and Peruvian seizures, and failed politically in the small Guatemalan and large 
Cuban and Chilean disputes. Also, the U.S. companies involved were all regarded as 
very influential and capable of gaining access to U.S. government officials at the
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highest levels. Nevertheless, three failed and three succeeded. The only hint of a trend 
is that the oil seizures were all resolved through diplomacy. This appears to be a false 
lead, however, given that the Guatemalan agrarian dispute (in a sector far less strategic 
than oil) was met by confrontation, while the petroleum seizures had been prompted by 
irresponsible behavior on behalf o f U.S. oil companies.
The State Department used similar mechanisms to defend U.S. interests during 
each dispute, regardless of whether U.S. policy was conciliatory or confrontational.
The Department only interposed officially in each case once the affected companies had 
exhausted all local remedies and direct negotiations had collapsed. Official diplomatic 
representation only appeared premature in the Guatemalan dispute. Even though a year 
passed before the State Department presented an official claim to the Arbenz 
government, the dispute was not given ample time to cool off, had the U.S. objective 
been to achieve an amicable settlement to the United Fruit Company's claim. This 
approach differed significantly from Under Secretary o f State Sumner Welles' earlier 
decision not to take formal action against the Bolivian confiscation of Standard Oil’s 
subsidiary given the existence of the Calvo Clause, a policy which the United States did 
not officially recognize.
While the Department did provide a degree o f assistance to U.S. claimants, it 
should have commissioned special envoys more often. Deployment o f special envoys 
in Mexico and Peru contributed to a successful resolution. In the highly sensitive 
Guatemalan, Cuban and Chilean disputes, however, the Department assigned no 
envoys, and failure to do so may have contributed to the poor outcomes of each case. 
While it is true that U.S. officials at the assistant secretary level from both the State
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and Treasury Departments did enter negotiations with Chilean officials, the dispute was 
only one o f numerous responsibilities, and could only be given limited attention.
Every dispute would have benefitted from the services o f an experienced private sector 
negotiator, whose presence would have helped to isolate specific seizures from political 
rhetoric, and whose attention would have been focused exclusively on the property 
seizure disputes.
By the close o f the Chilean dispute, it appears as though adequate institutions 
had been developed within the U.S. government for handling property seizure disputes. 
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission provided one o f several recourses for 
validating claims and determining just compensation. The Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation encouraged U.S. companies to assume a reasonable degree o f risk against 
expropriation when investing in markets into which they might not otherwise venture. 
The Inter-Agency Expropriation Group enabled a rational and unified U.S. response to 
future property seizures, in an era when an increasing number of U.S. government 
agencies have an interest in, and the capability o f influencing, U.S. foreign policy.
This arrangement benefits the State Department by creating a buffer between itself and 
its foreign counterparts, alleviating the burden o f verifying and validating claims, and 
by providing a forum for devising a coherent approach to U .S. government decision 
making.
Although the U .S. weathered four decades of periodic property seizure disputes, 
recent events in Latin America indicate that the days o f government seizures o f foreign- 
owned properties may be waning. Dissatisfaction with inefficient and unprofitable 
state-run activities over the past two decades pushed most Latin American nations
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toward divestment o f  these enterprises. However, since it is uncertain what the future 
holds for the hemisphere, the lessons learned from these earlier experiences must not be 
forgotten, and the mechanisms created to help resolve politically-charged property 
seizure disputes should continue to be refined.
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